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1 Introduction 
1.1 The scope and aim of this thesis 
In Rue de la Loi in Brussels, Belgium, lies the Berlaymont, the famous headquarter of the 
European Commission, the executive arm of the European Union. From this office building 
originates many decisions that affect citizens and organizations of the European countries. 
Among those with greatest impact are the decisions concerning the enforcement of EU 
competition law. These decisions and the proceedings leading to them form the scope of 
this thesis.  
 
Competition enforcement decisions have vast economic consequences directly and 
indirectly, they involve substantial elements of discretionary decisions, while at the same 
time, the reasoning behind these decisions is difficult to access for the public opinion. The 
choice of type of decision, and the type of procedure leading to that decision, is therefore 
well worth a close examination. 
 
The sheer size of fines alone indicate the massive impact of EU competition proceedings: 
From the introduction of the new procedural regulation in 2004
1
, the total amount of fines 
amounts to € 10.1 Billion2. This is equivalent to the GDP in a small country, such as 
Jamaica, Uganda or Albania
3
.  Considering that fines are only imposed in some of the 
competition cases, the sum of fines only gives a taste of the total impact of competition 
proceedings. For example the recent decision concerning free browser choice on all 
                                                 
1 
Council regulation 1/2003, henceforth reg. 1/2003. 
2 
Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/competition, not corrected for changes following judgments, last updated 11th 
November 2009. 
3 
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. 
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Windows PCs
4
, functioning retroactively in form of updates, will concern the 100 million 
PCs already using this operating system, and 30 million new European users each year
5
. 
 
Also the challenging legal aspects of such decisions make such an analysis important. 
Perhaps no other field than Competition law is characterized to such a degree by the 
interaction and tension between law and economics. The decisions imposed are legal in 
nature, but economic considerations are given substantial weight. The interaction between 
law and economy occurs at several levels. First, the rules are built upon economic 
considerations, and the law merely operationalizes
6
 the desired economic policy. Second, 
the nature of the activity governed by the rules is measured in economic terms in relation to 
the rules, i.e. the question of whether the legal boundaries of competition laws are 
overstepped is answered by use of economic considerations. Third, economic 
considerations are important for the enforcer, when it chooses its decision to address an 
infringement. It is these economic considerations of the enforcer form that relates to the 
scope of this thesis, namely the Commissions choice of type of decision it intends to 
impose, and thereby the type of proceeding leading to it.  
 
The modernization of competition enforcement in 2003
7
 left the Commission with different 
types of decisions with different types of proceedings leading to that specific type of 
decision. I will analyze the opportunity of the Commission to apply various forms of 
settlements, as opposed to a traditional fully adversarial process
8
. Settlements in EU 
competition law may be in form of commitment decisions
9
, in form of settlements 
rewarding cooperation with cost saving procedures
10
, and to some extent informal 
                                                 
4
 Microsoft browser case commitments, press release, IP/09/1941, Date:  16/12/2009. 
5
 Microsoft browser case commitments, frequently asked questions, MEMO/09/558    Date:  16/12/2009. 
6
 Kolstad (2009). 
7
 Reg. 1/2003. 
8
 Cfr. Art 7, reg. 1/2003, henceforth, when referred to art. 7 in this thesis, this implies art. 7 of reg. 1/2003. 
9
 Art. 9 Reg. 1/2003, henceforth, when referred to art. 9 in this thesis, this implies art. 9 of reg. 1/2003. 
10
 Art. 10a, Reg. 773/2004 henceforth, when referred to art. 10a in this thesis, this implies art. 10a of reg. 
773/2004. 
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settlements. The Commission may also choose not to follow up a case, if it does not find an 
infringement likely, or that the case would require extraordinary resources to follow up. 
 
The aim of this thesis to use economic theory to answer how the enforcement agency’s 
policy for ending cases over time may yield the highest social welfare. The primary object 
of this analysis is therefore the procedural EU law, especially concerning the ending of the 
enforcer’s competition proceedings. 
 
The scope of this thesis relates to a situation in which the Commission faces a complex 
decision. An economic analysis can structure the deliberations and analyses of the 
competition enforcer. They can provide the main factors of the analysis, and how they 
should be weighed against each other. However, economic reasoning cannot take into 
account all aspects of complex decisions, and it is therefore important to place the decision 
in context. It is therefore a secondary aim of this thesis to provide an outline also of the 
legal basis of such decisions, and address other issues arising in connection with the 
introduction of settlements in EU competition enforcement. 
 
The perspective of this analysis is that of the competition enforcer. In the European Union, 
the Commission is the central enforcement agency for the EU competition rules, and has a 
special role in enforcing competition law in the entire union market
11
.  
 
The decision is therefore analyzed from the Commission’s angle of view, even though the 
choice of type of decision and proceeding also involve other important stakeholders:  
 
 The national competition agencies (henceforth NCAs)12 are dependent on 
cooperating with the Commission. While the NCAs primary role is to enforce the 
member country’s own competition law, the Commission is responsible for 
                                                 
11
 TFEU Art. 105. 
12
 In fact they may be involved in the procedure., cfr. Art. 11, Reg. 1/2003. 
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enforcing trans-national competition matters, where the treaty directly applies, cfr. 
TFEU art. 101 and 10213. 
 
 The decision is also of great importance for the undertakings14, because they are 
directly affected by the decision. To some extent they also influence the 
proceedings, especially with regard to settlements, were negotiations are crucial. 
 
 Finally, third parties are affected by the proceedings, and may to some extent also 
influence the proceedings and the final decision. 
 
1.2 The purpose of the procedural competition law enforcement rules 
The procedural rules are only a part of the complex set of rules in the competition law and 
enforcement system comprising laws, institutions and enforcement procedures. The main 
function of the procedural rules is to ensure the competition rules are enforced as 
efficiently as possible. 
 
 In the very core of competition law lies as a premise that if the government abstains 
completely from intervention in the markets, some undertakings will profit from the market 
in a way harming social welfare. This is what justifies the cost of enforcing the competition 
rules. 
 
The general purpose of competition law can be expressed negatively as to obstruct 
undertakings from enriching themselves at the cost of the society as a whole by 
                                                 
13 In accordance with the wording “may affect trade between the Member states”. In case of conflict between 
national law and Community law where both may be applicable, the starting point is that Community law 
takes precedence over national law, see for example Case 6/64. Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., Competition Law 
(2008) p 75 etc. 
14 
The term is not defined in the EU treaty, ECJ has, in e.g. Case C-41/90. Judgment of the Court (Sixth 
Chamber) of 23 April 1991. Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH. GmbH, held that the term 
encompasses “every entity engaged in an economic activity”. Questions may arise as to whether 
organizations are “undertakings” or not, but for the purpose of this paper, no further considerations regarding 
the extent and scope of this term will be discussed. 
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collaborating or misusing market power. But it can also be expressed positively as to 
organize the market to induce innovation and competition, which in turn will benefit the 
economy as a whole as opposed to a completely unregulated market. 
 
With regard to the sanction rules, of which decisions are an important element, the 
purposes of these are to restore a competitive market in following the infringements, and to 
ensure proper incentives for the undertakings to behave in accordance with the competition 
rules. To effectively contribute to this, the sanctions for breaking the rules of competition 
serve several purposes. These can be grouped into the following categories: Ending the 
infringement, prevention and reparation15.  
 
Ending the infringement implies that the activity infringing the competition rules must be 
brought to an end. Ending the infringement early is usually of great importance, both as a 
means of reducing the loss caused by the infringement, but also to ensure none of the 
competitors are pressed out of the market by the infringing undertaking, which in turn 
could be detrimental for the competition on the market. 
 
Prevention relates to the deterrence of new infringements. It is quite safe to assume that 
without a functioning sanctions system, the effect of the competition rules will be greatly 
reduced16. Measures from the enforcer implying a preventive effect therefore correspond to 
future savings in infringement costs.  
 
Reparation relates to re-distributing the profit illegally gained by the infringer to those who 
have incurred losses because of the infringement, primarily consumers or competitors. 
Reparation is not the primary scope of this paper, first and foremost because it is not 
enforced by the competition authority itself, but rather through civil lawsuits. 
                                                 
15
 The following systematic organization of the different purposes of competition law sanctions is based on 
the grouping in Norsk Konkurranserett, Volume II (2006) p.17. 
16
 That the absence of a law enforcement authority leads to an increased level of infringement, has been 
demonstrated throughout history. In Copenhagen in 1944, the occupying Germans arrested the police force, 
though an improvised guard assumed some responsibility for enforcement, criminality increased rapidly, 
because of the lack of police. A similar situation arose during a police strike in Canada. 
  6 
 
The vast impact of competition law proceedings makes it necessary for the enforcer to take 
into account other factors than just the effectiveness of the remedy. For example, the costs 
of imposing the sanctions must be taken into consideration. As mentioned above, the 
competition rules are justified as a means of making the society as a whole benefit due to 
more competition. But if the sanction costs become too high, they may actually cause a loss 
to the society
17
. Even though infringements of the competition can be harmful to the 
society, the sanctions must not in turn exacerbate the loss for the society by leading to job-
loss, and uncertainty regarding investments and contracts that are to be completed.  
 
1.3 The methodology of this thesis 
Throughout the thesis I will use various theoretical frameworks in order to determine the 
optimal way of ending the proceedings. These frameworks include cost-benefit analyses, 
analyses of the firms’ individual behavior and principal-agent theory. 
 
The majority of the analyses in this thesis are economic in nature. But initially I will 
present the rules serving as a legal basis for the Commission’s decision. When deriving the 
content from the sources of law, I will rely upon the legal method of EU law. 
 
The legal review of the relevant rules aims at presenting the system of the procedural rules, 
and the decisions finding their legal basis in them. I have devoted more of the review to an 
overview of the system of sanctions rather than to deal with more marginal, but legally 
challenging questions that may arise in connection with the interpretation and application 
of the enforcement rules. To fully understand the rules, and place them in their right 
context, a brief description of the rest of the procedural system is also included.  
 
The main part of this thesis is a qualitative rather than a quantitative analysis, and the 
reasoning and findings of the thesis are presented in form of text. However, I sometimes 
                                                 
17
 Becker (1968). 
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use basic mathematical models, because they provide more accurate descriptions of effects 
than words alone. These are presented in the footnotes of the text, designated by letters 
instead of numbers. When these footnotes occur, the reader may choose to take a closer 
look on the expression, or to continue reading. I believe these expressions most accurately 
give a description of the analysis on which this thesis is based, but it is not necessary to 
read them to understand the thesis. 
 
I have, based upon material from the Commission, investigated the current use of 
settlements in EU, by use of simple statistics. The statistics demonstrate the impact, and 
thereby the relevance of settlements in EU enforcement proceedings, but are not directly 
related to the economic reasoning of the thesis. I have therefore chosen to present these 
findings in an appendix to the rest of the thesis. 
 
 
1.4 Terminology 
This thesis investigates the use of settlements in EU law. However, the European 
Commission has no procedure for ending competition cases which is generally applicable, 
that is specifically designated as a “settlement”18.  
 
 Through this thesis, I will use the word settlement for the forms of procedures in EU 
competition law implying a negotiated remedy, i.e. Art. 9 decisions, art. 10a decisions and 
informal settlements
19. When I use the word “settlement”, I therefore refer to any of the 
forms of settlements that can be used in EU law, i.e. commitment decisions, procedural 
settlements or more informal settlements. 
 
This will be more in line with general legal and economic terminology, and make it easier 
to draw upon existing analyses and literature, especially with regard to law and economics. 
                                                 
18
 Art. 10 a of 773/2004, use the word settlements, but this is limited to cartel cases. 
19
 This will be described further below. 
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The reader might like to bear in mind that when I refer to settlements this predominantly 
implies commitment decisions, as this is the by far most used type of settlement under the 
new procedural regime. 
 
The enforcer in this analysis is the Commission. Occasionally, I choose to use the more 
general word “enforcement agency” or “agency”, to indicate the generality of the analysis. 
Whenever the more general term “enforcement agency” is used this nonetheless refers to 
the Commission.  
 
In economic theory, the concept of utility, defined loosely as the satisfaction or happiness 
gained by an action, is used to weigh the consequences of actions against each other. In this 
thesis, I do not use the term utility, because most of the effects can be described using 
monetary values. I therefore use the term “value” on some occasions where one could use 
the term utility, such as in the “aggregate value” of a market for the consumers, resembling 
the utility of the consumers. 
 
Sometimes the Commission’s choice is referred to as a choice of type of decision and 
thereby the type of proceedings. Strictly speaking, the proceedings precede the final 
decision, but because of the differences in procedural requirements
20
, the Commission must 
follow the proceedings of the type of decision it intends to impose. It is therefore natural to 
describe the choice as a choice of type decision thereby requiring the appropriate type of 
proceeding rather than a choice of proceeding leading to a decision. 
 
1.5 The problems of this thesis 
The scope of this thesis is to shed light on the introduction of settlements in EU 
competition proceedings. The proceedings I investigate are the proceedings leading to a 
decision with a legal basis in Regulation 1/2003
21
, which is the antitrust and cartel 
                                                 
20
 For example, these are more extensive if the Commission wants to impose fines. 
21
 Proceedings related to f.ex. Mergers and State aid therefore falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
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proceedings. I seek to broadly assess the introduction of more formalized settlement 
procedures in light of EU law in order to answer in which situations the different sanctions 
should be used.  
 
The perspective is the enforcer’s, and the object of analysis is the effects of the different, 
specific alternatives
22
, where the enforcement agency should seek to chose the best 
applicable type of decision in each case. Because of the agency’s own budget, this 
corresponds to a constrained maximization problem. 
 
To fully answer the question of the enforcer, and place it in context, the main problems of 
this thesis are to  
 
1. Outline the legal and economic basis of the competition proceeding, in order to 
conduct an analysis of EU competition law enforcement  
 
2. Analyze if, and how the enforcer may use the widened choice of type of decision 
and the required type of proceeding leading to it, to increase the overall 
effectiveness of competition enforcement. 
 
3. Comment on the issues that arises because of the introduction and use of 
settlements in EU competition enforcement, in light of other academic work  
 
1.6 The outline of the thesis 
In order to elucidate the problems of this thesis, I will investigate several aspects of 
competition enforcement and law and economics. 
 
The purpose of chapter 2 to 5 is to address the first problem in this thesis, namely to outline 
the legal and economic basis of the competition proceeding. I will establish the scope of the 
                                                 
22
 In fact given by law, cfr. Reg. 1/2003. 
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analysis, outline the proceedings, and present the choices the commission with regard to 
different types of decision. I will further briefly comment upon the economic cost of 
infringements, which it is the primary aim of the enforcer to reduce. 
 
 In chapter 2, the general use of economic analyses on law is presented, as well as 
and how economic analyses might guide the enforcement agency in its discretionary 
decisions. 
 
 In chapter 3 and 4, the legal basis of the Commission’s decision is reviewed, an 
overview of the proceedings, and the nature and extent of the Commission’s 
competence is provided.  
 
 In chapter 5, the economic cost of competition infringements is assessed. 
 
In chapter 6 to 10, I will address the second problem in my thesis, namely to analyze if, and 
how the agency may use its range of choice regarding type of decision and required type of 
proceeding to reduce the economic cost of infringement. 
 
 In chapter 6 and 7, it is discussed how effective allocation of resources can 
contribute to reducing the cost of competition infringements. 
 
 In chapter 8, the various effects of choosing a type of decision are more closely 
assessed. It is illustrated, using i.a. case law, how the agency could and should use 
economic considerations in its decisions. It is demonstrated how law interacts with 
economic considerations, and how these considerations, with the general model in 
mind, can contribute to more efficient enforcement. 
 
 In chapter 9, it is assessed in more detail how the choice of type of decision affects 
the resource use of the enforcement agency. 
 
  11 
 In chapter 10, it is described a number of “typical cases”, i.e. situations where one 
type of decision usually is more appropriate. 
 
In chapter 11 to 13, I will address the third problem in my thesis, to investigate and discuss 
the use of the settlements, by describing important issues in relation to the introduction of 
settlements in EU competition enforcement, and finally conclude. The purpose of this 
section is to place the analysis into its context. 
 
 In chapter 11, important issues in relation to the introduction of settlements are 
outlined and commented on in light of academic works on competition proceedings 
Also, a comparative outlook on the US use of settlements, which were influential in 
the introduction of settlements in EU law, is provided. 
 
 In chapter 12, I provide ending comments. 
 
 In chapter 13, the thesis is concluded 
2 The use of economic analyses on law  
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I briefly introduce the field of law and economics, describe the types of law 
and economics analyses, as well as the scope and limitations of law and economics 
analyses. The purpose of this is to clarify important aspects of law and economics that are 
important to bear in mind during the further analysis. In addition to this, I will describe 
how law and economics can act as a guideline regarding discretionary decisions, which is 
the form of decisions this analysis concerns. 
  12 
2.2 An outline of the field of law and economics 
The field of law and economics is an approach to legal theory applying methods of 
economics to law23. In other words, it is the use of laws as the object of analysis using 
economic theory. Apart from its object of analysis, law and economics does not differ from 
other application of economic theory.  
 
Law has several features making the analysis of legal theory and practice different than 
most other objects for economic studies. First, the object of analysis is itself abstract. Laws 
do not exist physically, only the sources of law, and the effects that manifest when it is 
applied. This is why economic studies of law are generally concerned about the effect of 
law, i.e. how law manifests itself in measurable effects. 
 
Second, laws are a dynamic matter both in application in a specific case as well as the way 
it evolves as a system. The application of laws open up for a wide range of action, and the 
same sources of law can provide different effects because the circumstances have changed; 
the effects are therefore not static, though they are not entirely unstable and unpredictable. 
 
2.3 Types of law and economics 
Law and economics can apply to several aspects of law. In law and economics, it is 
common to differ between positive and normative law and economics. By positive law and 
economics is meant analysis of the effect of laws, i.e. seeking to explain how law works. 
By normative law and economics is meant using the findings about how law works to make 
policy recommendations to better ensure the efficiency of legal rules. 
 
Positive law and economics can be further divided24: First, into theoretical law and 
economics, in which one uses economic theory to predict the effects of law. Second, into 
                                                 
23
 Friedmann (1987). 
24
 Kolstad (2008). 
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empirical law and economics, which investigates empirical effects of law, using economic 
methods such as econometrics. 
 
Normative law and economics can be divided25 into normative jurisprudence, which 
primarily aims at explaining how the rules should be, regardless of their current shape and 
sources, and second into applied normative law and economics, which aims at providing 
the best solution possible, in an economic sense, which can be drawn from the available 
sources in a specific case. 
 
The analysis in this thesis does not fit accurately into any of these categories. The object of 
analysis is a choice between several remedies which are legally available. The aim of the 
thesis is to provide a guideline to which situations the different remedies will be 
appropriate. The analysis therefore consists of two elements, first to describe the effects, 
mainly drawing upon theoretical models, then to make recommendations based upon these 
conclusions. As such, the analysis therefore consists of a combination of positive analysis, 
and normative recommendations based on positive analysis. 
2.4 Scope and limitations of law and economics analyses 
Using economic theory is only one of several theoretical frameworks that can be used to 
describe the effect of rules of law. Other types of theory can also be used to describe how 
legal rules work, such as psychology, social science methods etc. Most of the theoretical 
frameworks these provide are, however, like academic study of law, qualitative in their 
nature. The use of economic theory opens up for combining qualitative and quantitative 
reasoning to a larger degree. Thus, they open up for seeing the rules in an entirely new 
light, and to make calculations that describe the effects of laws on basis of empirically 
reliant data. 
 
Law and economics is only one area in which there is a close interaction between two 
scholarly disciplines. In almost all other fields of science, attention has been drawn to inter-
                                                 
25
 Kolstad (2008). 
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disciplinary study. This development corresponds well to our understanding of how the 
different parts of the world interact and are inextricably bound together.  
 
Economics cannot provide exhaustive answers about all effects of law. Economic theory 
draws upon simple models to enable analyses of  the effect of a limited set of variables. To 
isolate the different variables relevant to the analysis of the effect of legal rules can be 
extremely rewarding when it comes to revealing correlations, causes and effects. At the 
same time, it does not take into account in all the aspects and nuances of complex legal 
questions. Fundamental assumptions are necessary to reduce the number of variables. 
Moreover, the answers derived from economic theory cannot be more accurate than the 
data it relies on. And in the field of law, the effect of law can often be described in 
measures that are hard or impossible to quantify, such as prevention, justice, fairness etc. 
 
Neoclassical economics26, which is the basis for most studies in law and economics, has 
been subject to systematic critique on basis of its assumptions. Criticism of the neoclassical 
economic theory points to many issues that are important to bear in mind when using the 
theoretical economic models. The criticism has come from various camps, but mainly 
relates to two categories.  
 
First, rational choice theory is criticized because of its cognitive foundations27, which 
relates to the fundamental premise of rational choice. Among this criticism is that the 
theory of rational choice makes unrealistic assumptions about how the participants in the 
market form their decisions, for example regarding perfect information. According to this 
criticism, the “economic man” of neoclassical economics is in reality unrealistic28.  
 
                                                 
26
 Referred to as “A collection of assumptions customarily made by mainstream economists starting in the 
late 19th century, including profit maximization by firms, utility maximization by consumers, and market 
equilibrium, with corresponding implications for determination of factor prices and the distribution of 
income.” Deardorff (2009). 
27
 Brian (1997). 
28
 Thorstein Veblen (1898). 
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Especially lately, the hypothesis of rational economic players has been criticized. But this 
criticism relates more to market behavior in itself
29
 than to white-collar crimes. One may 
relatively safely assume that most willful competition infringements are more or less 
rational acts motivated by profit. The enforcement agency should also seek to enforce 
competition law in a way that at least not gives incentives to breaking the law. This confers 
to a need for logical consistency in the enforcement. Assuming most players over time to 
be rational may be a good guideline to enforce the rules effectively, and minimize adverse 
effects.  
 
Second, the theory has been criticized because of its structural foundations30. It is held that 
the general equilibrium analysis and game theory payoff matrices provide a too simple 
explanation of how the participants really interact. This may especially relate to how 
neoclassical economics incorporate into it an economy that develops and the role capital 
goods
31
 
 
Despite the objections to use of neoclassical economics, I find it justifiable to use 
microeconomic models in this thesis. First, the aim of this thesis is to analyze only a very 
small part of the economy, in a situation less complex than the overall real economy, and 
where the specter of choices are genuinely limited because of the procedural rules. Such a 
situation is better suited for an analysis using simple frameworks, because many of the 
presumptions necessary follows directly from legal regulation. 
 
Second, the rational choice theory might very well be too inaccurate to describe how a 
specific market participant will act with reliable certainty in a specific situation. However, 
when analyzing the rules generally, to describe how the market participants generally will 
act, the theory can provide clear indications because the variances will not be as extreme as 
in a specific case.  
                                                 
29
 Such as buyers and sellers of advanced financial products. 
30
 Brian (1997). 
31
 Such objections have been raised and discussed often in economic literature, an example being the 
”Cambridge Capital controversy”. 
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Third, the market participant in question in the following thesis is an organization rather 
than an individual. Organizations are assumed to act different from physical persons, 
because their choices as well as their expected outcomes are different. The organization 
itself cannot, for example be imprisoned, and its limited liability induces greater risk-taking 
behavior. Application of the theory of rational choice to organizations can therefore 
provide greater accuracy than for physical persons. 
 
With regard to the analysis of the rules of law, the question is therefore not whether a 
model describes the real-life situation as accurately as possible, but whether one is able to 
infer relevant, verifiable and interesting conclusions from the analysis. 
 
Like any other use of theory, use of economic theory can be likened to putting on a new 
pair of glasses. They open up for seeing the world in a new light, and can provide more 
detailed and accurate information, and thus reveal unseen truths. One must, however, not 
forget that one wears those glasses. If so, the models become a bias rather than an angle of 
approach. 
 
Theoretically rewarding use of economic theory therefore encompasses at least two 
important aspects. First, knowledge of the models themselves, how they work, and how to 
interpret the results they yield. And second, sound knowledge of the scope and limitations 
of the models, what information they will provide accurately, and what they will not 
answer.  
 
2.5 Economic analyses as a guideline in discretionary decisions 
Law is but a tool for policymakers to give life to their decisions, and ensure application 
consistent with the desired policy. In other words, laws operationalize32 the intent of the 
                                                 
32
 Kolstad (2008). 
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policymakers. But acting as a tool for the policy makers, laws can never absolutely realize 
the exact intent of the policymaker. 
 
While many policies can be implemented by enforcing norms prescribing cause and effect, 
given in written text, as is most usual in our legal order, in a fully functioning legal system, 
some room must be left to discretionary decisions. A detailed normative system opens up 
for analogies and extended interpretation as unexpected situations requires application of 
the law. A less detailed legal system opens up for limiting interpretations of wide-reaching 
norms. In most well working legal systems, a fair balance has been struck between these 
two extremes. 
 
To a certain extent, a lack of materially oriented law, i.e. in its simplest form, norms 
prescribing cause and effect, can be mended by more extensive procedural regulations, for 
example constituting who is to decide, in what forms the decision must be made etc. Most 
changes in constitutions are for example dependent on qualified vote by a competent 
assembly, typically a parliament, and such examples apply to many forms of norms. 
 
But even the most intricate and sophisticated procedures opens up for a certain amount of 
discretionary decisions. Especially when the norms open up for a wide range of actions, or 
leave open several alternatives, the law enforcer must often choose between different 
alternatives, with or without being able to seek any significant guidance in the law – often 
because it is the intention of the law-maker to leave this decision to the organ deemed most 
competent. 
 
Especially in complex fields of law, the problem of imposing the right decision becomes 
crucial. Here, the authority enforcing the law often seeks to combine aims which are 
difficult to unite. The problem in question in this thesis is such a problem, as it is left to the 
enforcement agency to make the decision on which type of decision it wants to implement 
on the actual case. By acting as an enforcement agency the competition authority have a 
broad responsibility for minimizing the loss caused by anti-competitive behavior.  
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In Norwegian law33 this is usually done by weighing the relevant sources of law, their 
meaning correctly interpreted, against each other. In case of collision between norms34, 
there exist norms regarding which rules to apply, and to arrive at the correct solution. 
 
Apart from the rules governing the competence to impose a decision, the Commission does 
not have a set of norms that absolutely guides it to the right decision, and it must therefore 
also use its discretionary competence when applying the rules. 
 
An economic analysis can serve several purposes in relation to such a decision. First, it can 
indicate the how the agency can apply the rules to form an optimal policy for ending cases. 
Second it can serve as a starting point in relation to an analysis of the sanction rules, to 
analyze whether or not the sanctions system is an effective tool in the application of the 
norms enforced. 
 
It was such application of economics to the field of criminology that Gary Becker 
introduced in his seminal article “Crime and punishment”35. In the words of Becker, one 
needs to establish a “criterion that goes beyond catchy phrases and gives due weight to the 
damages from offences, the cost of apprehending and convicting offenders, and the social 
cost of punishments”. In the article, he demonstrated how the welfare function of modern 
welfare economics can act as such a criterion. 
 
The strong bonds between economics and law in the field of competition law make use of 
economic frameworks particularly relevant: The competition rules are the ground rules for 
the market itself, which is usually the objective of study in economy. Further, the 
motivation of the participants in the market, which are the subjects of the legal rules, is 
economic. The very infringement of the competition rules is, in essence, that one gains an 
                                                 
33
 Eckhoff (2001) p. 20 – following. 
34
 Eckhoff (2001) Chapter 13. 
35
 Becker (1968) p. 181. 
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illegal profit by acting contrary to the competition rules. Finally, economic theory has a 
vital impact on the making of competition law, and the infringements usually consist of 
distorting the markets in an undesired manner. 
 
In a broader competition context, in relation to the choice of type of decision, such a 
criterion can be an effective indicator on the effectiveness of the enforcement system. Also 
here is needed criterions that give due weight to the various effects the decision will imply. 
It is on this basis I have chosen to use economic analytical tools to address the problems in 
this thesis. 
3 A legal review of the enforcement proceedings 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will outline the enforcement proceedings from a legal viewpoint, by 
pointing out the relevant rules, the rules governing the proceedings, and the stages of the 
enforcement proceedings. Moreover, I will describe the different “tracks” of enforcement at 
the Commission’s disposal, encompassing formal and more informal tracks of proceedings 
that may lead to a decision. The aim of this chapter is to give an outline of the legal 
framework in the proceedings, and show how the proceedings, whose final decision is the 
object of my analysis, progress. 
 
3.2 The relevant rules 
The relevant rules with respect to the sanctions system of EU competition law have their 
legal basis in TFEU art. 103 which imply that further and more specific rules are to be 
introduced.  
 
With regard to the proceedings, the most important of these is Council Regulation 1/2003, 
henceforth Regulation 1/2003, Commission Regulation 773/2004, as well as relevant case 
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law36. These regulations were a part of the modernization process of European competition 
law, and entered in force from 1 May 2004. 
 
Regulation 1/2003 contains the most important procedural rules relating to EU competition 
law enforcement. With regard to the sanctions system and possibilities for ending the 
proceedings, the most important rules are found in the regulations chapter III: Commission 
decisions:  
 
 Article 7 decisions form the legal basis for the Commission to find and order the 
termination of an infringement, impose remedies, and if needed, a fine with basis in 
art. 23. with basis in regulation 773/2004, art. 10a, the commission may also reward 
cooperation in the proceedings by reducing the fine by 10 %, in a procedural 
settlement
37
. 
 
 Article 9 provides the legal basis for commitments, which basically is a form for 
settlement. Following negotiations, the undertaking(s) in question make an offer for 
a commitment that aims at solving what might be an infringement. Subsequently, 
the Commission decides whether to make the commitment binding, in which case it 
is given legal force. Given that the undertaking complies with the commitment, the 
Commission concludes that there are no longer any grounds for action, and the 
process comes to an end. In other words, there is a remedy, but no decision finding 
an infringement. 
 
 The Commission also has the possibility of concluding that the competition rules 
are not applicable to the case, i.e. negatively finding an infringement, Art. 10. In 
addition to this, more informal settlements may also still be used
38
. 
                                                 
36 
Wills (2008). 
37 
The Commission may, at its own discretion also reward cooperation in cases other than with basis in 10a 
decisions, cfr. The Commissions guidelines on setting fines, para. 29. However, art. 10a decisions are the  
only type of decision in which the undertaking has a legal claim to this reduction. 
38 
Wils (2006) b, p. 23. 
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3.3 Background and characteristics of EU competition rules 
Regulation 1/2003 is a part of a modernization of the enforcement of EU competition rules. 
It aims at better addressing infringements, and allocating resources to best improve 
competition in EU markets. 
 
Traditionally, when the EU originated, there was little tradition for competition law in 
Europe. Thus, it was concluded that enforcement of competition should be centralized to 
one institution, to better ensure harmonious and effective enforcement. 
 
This situation is now radically different. There are now fully functional NCAs that are both 
competent and capable of enforcing competition rules even in complex international 
markets. Further both undertakings and stakeholders are very aware of the competition 
rules, and these rules which play an important part in their choice of actions. 
 
This development has increased the need for, and made it less alarming that national NCAs 
and even the undertakings themselves take a more active role in competition proceedings. 
If successful, such involvement can lead to better integration between the stakeholders in a 
competition case proceeding, better resource allocation, and finally; better results.  
 
Due to more active stakeholders and the resource constraints of the Commission, a policy 
of settling cases informally began. While providing flexibility for the parties involved, this 
method of ending the proceedings lacked the transparency and formalized framework that 
characterized other competition decisions. Thus, a need for legal regulations arose, and it 
was natural to address this in the modernization process. 
 
The widened cooperation with NCAs and the parties involved is not entirely 
unproblematic, and gives rise to new problems. One example of this is pluralism in 
enforcement of the rules, which themselves open up for a wider variety of sanctions, when 
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the same rules are applied by different institutions.39 This heterogenity in both enforcement 
and types of decisions has made the he need for transparency and predictability through the 
rule of law even more crucial than it was before. 
 
3.4 Overview of the Commission’s procedure leading to a decision 
3.4.1 Timeline 
After the start of the investigation, the further procedure of the Commission investigating 
and finding infringements consists of two successive stages40: First, the Commission 
investigates facts, second, it makes its objections known to the concerned undertakings and 
takes any decision it deems necessary. The third stage is the optional judicial review of the 
decisions by courts, if the Commission’s decision is contested. 
 
 
 
Despite there being three major stages in a competition proceeding, the Commission has 
the option of choosing different “tracks” of enforcement procedure, dependent on the type 
of decision it intends to make. 
 
                                                 
39
 Norsk konkurranserett, Volume II (2006) p. 11. 
40 
PVC cartel cases:  Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) (C-238/99 P), DSM NV and DSM 
Kunststoffen BV (C-244/99 P), Montedison SpA (C-245/99 P), Elf Atochem SA (C-247/99 P), Degussa AG 
(C-250/99 P), Enichem SpA (C-251/99 P), Wacker-Chemie GmbH and Hoechst AG (C-252/99 P) and 
Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) (C-254/99 P) v Commission of the European Communities, cfr. EC 
antitrust procedure  (2005) 1-039. 
Start Stage 1
• Fact 
finding
Stage 2
• Hearing 
and 
decision
Stage 3
• Judicial 
review
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The basis has traditionally been the elaborate art. 7 procedures, which ensures that the 
undertaking has an option of defending itself before the Commission imposes a decision. 
Also in case there has been a complaint, certain procedures must be followed. However, in 
cases where the parties negotiate the outcome of the case; there is less need for a procedure 
resembling a trial.  
 
The Commission may in such cases proceed more informally, such as with art. 9 decisions, 
which, for example, do not require the lengthy statement of objections. In these more 
informal proceedings, the procedure is just as much aimed at informing other parties of the 
intended decision, and ensure that these may voice their objections to the proposed 
solution. 
 
It lies within the Commission’s discretion to decide what procedure to follow, but the 
undertakings can of course not be forced to negotiate. In case one “track” of proceedings 
does not lead to a decision, the Commission may seek to use another track to ensure a final 
result. 
 
3.4.2 The start of the investigation 
The investigation starts when the Commission decides to investigate a case to assess 
whether or not a competition infringement procedure should be initiated. To decide this, the 
Commission must obtain information about the possible infringement. This may come from 
various sources, both from the Commissions own investigation, the undertakings 
themselves, or from third parties: 
 
 Formal complaint 
 Transfer from NCA41 
                                                 
41 
Typically because the case affects “trade between the Member states”, cfr Art. 101 and 102. If the 
Commission initiates proceedings to adopt a decision, the NCA is relieved of its competence, cfr. Art. 11 (6), 
Reg. 1/2003. 
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 Acting on its own initiative42 
 Leniency applicants43 
 Informal complaints 
 
Complaints have traditionally been very important in obtaining information about possible 
infringements44. The last decade, the Commission has, on its own initiative, more often 
sought to inquire into whole business sectors where the market does not seem to work as 
well as it should
45
 Moreover, the undertakings themselves have increasingly been 
supplying information about own infringements in cartel cases under the leniency regime, 
which may result in a substantial reduction of fines if leniency is granted
46
. 
 
3.4.3 Stage 1 Fact finding 
The first stage of the investigation may proceed formally or informally
47
.If informal 
investigation is sufficient to detect adequate information and evidence regarding the case, 
the Commission may not need to use its formal investigative powers. If the undertakings do 
not cooperate, the Commission is nonetheless entitled to acquire necessary information 
from the undertakings. The investigative powers include: 
 
 The right of request for information Art. 18, reg. 1/2003, 
 The power to take statements Art. 19, reg. 1/200348 
 The right for inspection of business books, records etc Art. 20, reg. 1/2003. 
 Inspection of private homes, Art. 21, reg. 1/2003 
                                                 
42 
For example through sector inquiries, cfr. art. 17 of Reg. 1/2003. 
43
 CFR. Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction 
of fines in cartel cases, Official Journal of the European Union 2006, C 298/17. 
44 
EC Antitrust procedure (2004) 2-005. Cfr. PVC cartel case, supra note. 
45 
European Commission, (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiries.html. 
46 ”In the period from 14 February 2002 until the end of 2005, the Commission received 167 applications 
under the 2002 Leniency Notice (see IP/02/247 and MEMO/02/23). Of these applications, 87 were requests 
for immunity and 80 were requests for reduction in fines”, cfr.  MEMO/06/470 
47
 EC Antitrust procedure (2004) 1-039. 
48
 Though  the interview requires consent. 
  25 
 Investigations by NCAs, Art. 22, reg. 1/2003  
 
Compliance with these rights can be enforced by use of fines Art. 23, reg. 1/2003
49
. The 
power to impose fines relates to several stages of the process. Fines can be imposed 
because of failure to cooperate during the proceedings, because of the infringements 
themselves (which makes them a part of the decision, cfr. below), or because of failure to 
comply with the Commission’s decision.  
 
During the investigation, the Commission must observe procedural rules. Though the 
European Convention of Human Rights
50
 EU is not directly a part of EU law, court practice 
has determined that fundamental rights are a part of the general principles of community 
law
51
. Some of these are now codified in the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights
52
. For 
instance Art. 41 provides a) the right to be heard, b) access to file and c)the obligation of 
the administration to give reasons for its decision. These rights resemble the right to a “fair 
trial” after ECHR art. 6. 
 
The procedural safeguards also include a privilege against self-incrimination, which may 
give the undertakings some right to refuse to supply information
53
. Further, there is a 
client-lawyer privilege, which allows the undertakings to withhold certain documents
54
. 
This is limited to correspondence with independent lawyers relevant for the case. 
 
In case there has been lodged a complaint, there are some procedural rules that must be 
observed by the Commission. If a formal complaint is lodged, the Commission has a duty 
to assess it, in the words of ECJ “nothing justifies the Commission in avoiding its 
obligation to undertake … a thorough and impartial examination of the complaints made to 
                                                 
49 
There are no penalties for not complying with the power to take statements after art. 19. 
50
 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, henceforth ECHR 
51 
cfr. C29/26 Stauder. 
52 
 [2000] O.J. C/364/1. 
53
 Case 374/87 Orkem, and Case 27/88, Solvay. 
54 
Case 155/79m[1982] AM and S Europe Ltd. 
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it”.55 The Commission is required to notify the complainant by letter if it does not want to 
pursue the case, and give the complainant time to give additional information
56
. Final 
decisions regarding the proceedings are then made. If the case is rejected, the complainant 
may challenge the decision before court
57
. 
 
3.4.4 Stage 2 Hearing and decision 
In stage two, the Commission either initiates the procedure, or ends the case. The 
proceedings may be informal or formal. The initiation is a formal step required to reach a 
final decision
58
, but the decision to initiate the proceedings cannot itself be contested, only 
the results of a proceeding
59
. At latest, the initiation of the case must be at the day where a 
preliminary assessment as referred to in art. 9, a statement of objections or a notice 
pursuant to art. 27 (4) is issued
60
. 
 
Notice to parties concerned 
Giving notice to parties concerned is vital in the initiated proceedings. Art. 10 (1) of Reg. 
773/2004 obliges the Commission to “inform the parties concerned in writing of the 
objections raised against them”. The statement of objections must set out the facts and legal 
arguments that form the basis for the Commission’s case61. The final decision cannot 
address other objections than those made known to the undertaking in a statement of 
objections, and the undertaking must have been able to comment on it
62
 
 
                                                 
55 
Case C-170/02 Schlüsselverlag J.S. Moser and Others v Commission,para 29. 
56 
Art. 7 Reg. 773/2004. 
57 
See for example Case T-24/90. Automec Srl v Commission of the European Communities. 
58 
Case 127-73. Belgische Radio en Televisie v SV SABAM and NV Fonior.  Belgium. BRT-II. 
59
 IBM Personal computer, 84/233/EEC: Commission Decision of 18 April 1984 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.849 IBM personal computer). 
60 
Art. 2(1) Reg. 773/2004. 
61 
EC antitrust procedure 4-018. 
62 
Art. 11 (2), Reg. 773/2004. 
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Though necessary to reach a conclusion, the statement of objections is a procedural step, 
not a final decision, and the statement itself may not be contested before the court
63
. The 
statement of objections is usually an extensive document, which may run over a several 
hundred pages in complex cases
64
.  
 
In some cases, the Commission therefore resort to the less comprehensive “preliminary 
assessment”, or publish a notice65. While this is not sufficient to adopt a decision after art. 
7, such notices are adequate for the purpose of commitment decisions
66
.  
 
This notice must consist in a “concise summary of the case and of the commitment or of 
the proposed course of action”, cfr. Art. 27 (4). It is a minimum requirement to adopt an 
Art. 9 or 10 decision after Reg. 1/2003. The summary is just as much aimed at third parties 
as the undertaking, for example those indirectly affected by a commitment
67
. Also the 
suspected infringer must be given notice of the initiation of the proceedings
68
.  In cases 
were settlements are appropriate, however, the more informal procedure the undertakings 
are usually well aware of the initiated procedure, and the initiation of the case, and the 
notice of proposed actions is therefore published as a press release
69
, mostly aimed at third 
parties. 
 
Following the Statement of Objections, the Commission sets a time limit for the 
undertaking to respond
70
, or in case of a notice compliant with Art. 27 (4), a time limit for 
interested parties to respond.  
 
Notice of fines 
                                                 
63 
IBM personal computer, supra note. 
64 
EC antitrust procedure 4-020. 
65 
Example: RWE Gas Foreclosure OJ C 310, 05.12.2008. 
66 
Art. 27 (4), Reg. 1/2003. 
67 
See for example Case T-170/06 Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission of the European Communities. 
68 
Cfr. Above. 
69 
See for example RWE Gas Foreclosure OJ C 310, 05.12.2008. 
70
 Art. 10, reg. 773/2004. 
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The Commission may not impose fines without first informing the party concerned
71
. The 
Statement of objections must make it clear that the Commission intends to impose a fine. 
This is to ensure that the undertakings are given a chance to defend themselves also against 
the possibility of a fine. The Commission must set out details of why the fine is to be 
imposed
72
. But the requirement to do so is only demanded as far as it is necessary for the 
defense of the undertaking
73
. 
 
Given this requirement, there is already at an early stage of a proceeding two categories of 
cases, those were fines are appropriate, and those were fines are not. This decision is also 
influential on the range of remedies available to the Commission in the case.  
 
In case a fine is intended, Art. 7 is the only decision opening up for a legal basis to impose 
a fine
74
, and the more extensive procedure leading to an art. 7 decision must be followed. 
There are still room negotiated remedies, but only in form of Art. 10 a procedural 
settlements, which is only applicable in cartel cases. 
 
If a fine is not intended, the Commission may choose both art. 7 decisions, as well as 
accept commitments from the undertakings. It is also in these situations the use of informal 
settlements could be possible. 
 
The extensive nature of Statements of objections combined with the procedural regulations 
regarding art. 7 decisions, the Commission may sometimes sacrifice the possibility to 
impose fines in exchange for a more informal procedure. Indeed, the Commission has been 
criticized for using commitment decisions in cases were fines would otherwise have been 
likely
75
. 
 
                                                 
71 
Cases T-25/95 Cimenteries. 
72 
EC antitrust procedure (2004) 4-023. 
73 
Case T-48/00 Corus UK v. Commission. 
74 
The fines have basis in art. 23 of reg. 1/2003. 
75 
Waelbroeck (2008). 
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The parties’ right to be heard 
The right to be heard for the undertaking is one of the fundamental rights of the 
undertaking
76
. The Commission may in its final decision deal only with those objections on 
which the undertaking has been able to Comment
77
. The right to be heard also encompass 
the right to an oral hearing, if the undertaking requests it
78
. While the right in particular 
concerns undertakings subject to proceedings and complainants, the Commission, if it 
considers it necessary, may also hear other parties
79
. 
 
To ensure a fair procedure which observes full contradiction, the parties are also granted 
access to the Commissions file on the case, Art. 27 (2). The right to access of the 
Commission’s file, resembles the “equality of arms” principle in ECHR, and is also set out 
in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art. 41 (2) b.  
 
Interim measures 
The Commission may take interim measures in “cases of urgency due to the risk of serious 
and irreparable damage to competition, cfr. Art. 8, reg. 1 /2003. Interim measures are 
subject to a preliminary
80
 decision, and may only apply for limited time
81
. In practice, the 
uses of interim measures are rare. 
 
Advisory Committee 
Consulting the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions is a 
requirement for the Commission to reach a decision under Art. 7, 8, 9 10, 23, 24 (1) and 29 
(1), cfr. Art. 14, Reg 1/2003. The committee consists of representatives from the 
competition authorities in the different member states. The role of the committee is 
primarily to ensure harmonious application of competition law across the entire union. The 
                                                 
76 
Art. 27, Reg 1/2003. 
77 
Art. 11(2). Reg. 773/2004. 
78
 Art. 12 Reg. 773/2004. 
79 
Art. 27(3), Reg. 773 /2004. 
80 “Prima facie”, in the words of reg. 1/2003. 
81 
Art. 8 (2), Reg. 1/2003, though, the decision may be renewed. 
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Commission is obliged to take “utmost account of the opinion delivered by the Advisory 
Committee”82.  
 
The Commission’s decision 
Following the proceedings, the Commission decides whether to impose a decision or not. 
This may result in a decision pursuant to Art. 7 (possibly including fines, Art. 23), 9, 10 of 
regulation 1/2003 or 10 a of regulation 773/2004.The different outcomes of a competition 
proceeding will be described in more detail below, under part 4 
 
3.4.5 Stage 3 Judicial review 
If the parties concerned contest the decision, judicial review is ensured by the General 
Court and ultimately the European Court of Justice. In accordance with TFEU Art. 263, the 
“Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, of acts 
of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than 
recommendations and Opinions”. This implies a wide scope of the judicial review, 
encompassing jurisdiction with regard to penalty, legal competence, observance of 
procedural requirements, infringements of treaties, or misuse of powers
83
. Failure of the 
Commission to act may also give reason for judicial review, cfr. TFEU Art. 265.  
 
4 The different outcomes of a competition proceeding. 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the different outcomes of a competition proceedings, from the 
Commission’s side, is outlined. Since the perspective of this thesis is the Commission’s, 
                                                 
82 
Art. 14 (5), reg. 1/2003. 
83 
TFEU Art. 263 (2). 
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the aim of this chapter is to present in more detail what types of decisions the Commission 
can impose, and the nature and extent of these decisions from a legal angle of approach. 
The rules giving the legal basis to the Commission’s decision constrain the types of 
decision the Commission may impose, and the nature and extent of these is therefore 
important to clarify with regard to the further analysis.  
4.2 The basis: Article 7: Finding and termination of infringement  
Article 7 forms the legal basis for Commission decisions to find and order the termination 
of infringements of the competition rules. The wording of article 7 requires the 
Commission finding that there is, or has been an infringement of TFEU article 101 or 10284. 
This implies that the Commission must hold the burden of proof to be satisfied, cfr. Art. 2, 
Reg. 1/2003. 
 
In the words of ECJ in the Cement case
85
 
 
“As the Council very recently stated in the fifth recital of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 
and 102 of the Treaty[now 101 and 102] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1), it should be for the party or 
the authority alleging an infringement of the competition rules to prove the existence 
thereof and it should be for the undertaking or association of undertakings invoking the 
benefit of a defense against a finding of an infringement to demonstrate that the conditions 
for applying such defense are satisfied, so that the authority will then have to resort to 
other evidence. [Author’s highlight]” 
 
The Commission shall in principle act only against actual infringements86, and not make 
decisions regarding potential breaches. This follows from case-law by the General Court, 
                                                 
84 
Art. 7, reg. 1/2003. 
85
 Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P: Aalborg 
Portland A/S and Others v Commission of the European Communities. 
86
 EC antitrust procedure  (2005) Sec. 6 - 021, cfr., Case T-34/92 Fiatagri UK Ltd and New Holland Ford Ltd 
v Commission of the European Communities. para. 39. 
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but also the wording of article 7 require that an infringement of either TEC art. 101 or 102 
exist. However, the Commission often uses “like effects” orders, concerning acts of the 
undertakings with similar effects, which in reality concerns potential breaches
87
. In such 
cases the commission acts against future infringements, but only in cases where an 
infringement has been established. 
 
Notwithstanding the Commissions lack of power to act against potential infringements, the 
legality of the legal actions of the undertakings is subject to the general rule of art. 101 (1). 
At the point the legal actions represents an infringement, it is automatically void, cfr.  Art. 
101 (2).  
  
Regarding past breaches the Commissions powers reach farther; it follows from art. 7 (1) 
that if the Commission has a legitimate interest in doing so, it may also find that an 
infringement has been committed in the past, which is referred to as a “declaration in 
respect of past breaches”. Such legitimate interest can arise from i.e. the power to impose 
fines by reference to the duration88, to easier facilitate private suits for damages caused by 
the infringement, or simply stating the infringement in the form of a decision and 
publicizing it, which may in itself prevent future infringements. 
4.2.1 Requirements regarding the reasoning of the decision 
There are few formal requirements regarding the Commission finding and ordering the 
termination of an infringement, and none following directly from regulation 1/2003. But 
according to TFEU article 296, the Commission must establish the reasons on which it 
takes the decision. In “PVC89”, ECJ highlighted that “the operative part of such a decision 
can be understood, and its full effect ascertained, only in the light of the statement of 
objections”. In other words, the decision must be adequately reasoned, and this seems to be 
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a condition for the validity of the decision as well as determining for the scope and reach of 
the decision. 
 
Further requirements regarding the reasoning of the decision can be found in reg 1/2003 
art. 27 (1) after which the Commission “shall base its decisions only on the objections on 
which the parties concerned have been able to comment”.  There must, in other words, 
have been sufficient contradiction about the issues on which the commission bases its 
decision. 
4.2.2 The nature of the remedies imposed with legal basis in art. 7 
Article 7 empowers the Commission to a variety of ways of ordering the infringement to an 
end. First, the Commission may simply require the undertakings to bring the infringement 
“to an end”. This is usually referred to as a cease and desist order90, and gives the 
undertaking a wide margin for deciding how to end the infringement, although the decision 
usually specifies a time by which the infringement must have ended. 
 
Second, the Commission can prescribe measures that positively require the undertaking to 
undertake actions to end the infringement. The wording of article 7 has a wide reach, and 
empowers the Commission to use “any behavioral or structural remedies”.  
 
By behavioral remedies is meant a wide range of remedies that aims at altering the 
behavior of the undertaking concerned to end the infringement. Such remedies can for 
example consist in making agreements void, bar certain forms of agreements or to enter 
into contractual relations with certain parties, or prohibit sharing information.  
 
Structural remedies include different types of remedies. The most far-reaching of these may 
imply splitting a company up, for example vertically by separating production and 
distribution, or horizontally by creating smaller, less dominant firms. Less draconian 
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structural remedies typically include altering the organization of the undertaking, for 
example by ensuring two divisions of the company do not cooperate
91
   
 
The distinction between behavioral and structural remedies is not stringent, and there is no 
commonly agreed definition of the two categories92. The ECJ has emphasized that the 
distinction is “immaterial” and that it is the effect of the remedy, and not the category that 
is of importance93. 
 
However, the wording of art. 7 relates, in contrast to art. 3 of 17/62, specifically to the 
distinction between behavioral and structural remedies. According to art. 7, structural 
remedies can only be imposed when there is “no equally effective” behavioral remedy, or 
when any equally effective remedy would be “more burdensome” for the undertaking 
concerned. Structural remedies thus become a secondary remedy to behavioral ones. Court 
practice indicates that the decision of which remedy is the more burdensome should, within 
the limits of reason, be that of the undertaking concerned94.  
 
Within the categories of structural and behavioral remedies, the variety of instruments the 
Commission may use to end infringements have been interpreted quite wide by the ECJ, for 
instance in Magill, where the court held that art. 3 of reg 17/62 [predecessor of art. 7]  
 
“… is to be applied according to the nature of the infringement found and may include an 
order to do certain acts or things which, unlawfully, have not been done as well as an 
order to bring an end to certain acts, practices or situations which are contrary to the 
Treaty” 
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In other words, the Commission may prescribe positive as well as negative measures to be 
imposed on the undertaking, which opens up for remedies of virtually any nature that the 
Commission sees fit to use, and is within its power to order, which will be discussed below.  
4.2.3 The extent of the remedies imposed with legal basis in art. 7 
Article 7 present the Commission with a wide range of remedies, but the extent of these are 
not limitless. Limitations in the extent of power under article 7 are found both in the 
wording of the article, court practice as well general principles of EU law.  
 
Already art. 5 (2) of TEU holds that the EU shall act “only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives 
set out therein”. Further art. 5 (1) prescribes the use of government competence to be 
“governed by the principles of subsidiary and proportionality”.  
 
Further, it follows from art. 7 itself that the remedy must be “proportionate”. This 
proportionality relates to “the infringement committed” and not to the company itself. In 
principle, the Commission cannot impose greater penalties on bigger companies. The 
remedy must also be an effective means of bringing the infringement to an end; this finds 
its basis in the requirement for the remedy to be “appropriate” to bring the infringement to 
an end.  
 
From the wording of article 7, seen in connection with case law, there seems to be two 
important principles relating to the Commissions powers under art. 7. First, it can be noted 
that, according to the wording of article 7, the scope and extent of the Commissions power 
is closely related to the infringement. The Commission cannot impose a decision that goes 
any further that to bring the undertakings actions in compliance with EU law. In line with 
this, the Commission can for example not require the undertakings to compete95 
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In other words, the decision terminating the infringement carries no penalty – the element 
of penalty in the decisions should come from the fines, not the decision itself. As held by 
the Court in “Magill”, the “burdens imposed on the undertakings in order to bring an 
infringement of competition law to an end must not exceed what is appropriate and 
necessary to attain the objective sought, namely compliance with the rules infringed. The 
Court therefore seems to have a goal-oriented approach in deciding competition cases, 
where fulfilling the aim of the rules is the most important. 
 
Such an approach is natural, because the goal of competition rules is to accommodate fair 
competition for the benefit of the society as a whole, especially consumers, not for the 
benefit of specific undertakings. The competition rules are not goals in themselves, merely 
means to realize goals.  The Commission should not restore justice or provide reparation 
for specific undertakings through the competition rules, but always aim to provide fair 
competition at all times, and act to restore this in case of infringements.  
 
But the limits does not prohibit measures that completely restores the competition, even  if 
this goes further than to just stopping the act that constituted the infringement. If the effects 
of that act remains, the Commission may remedy those effects, cfr. Case C-119/97 P, 
Union Française de l'Express (Ufex) p94. Here, the court held that  
 
“If anti-competitive effects continue after the practices which caused them have ceased, the 
Commission thus remains competent under Articles 2, 3(g) and 86 [ now TFEU 2, 3 and 
102] of the Treaty to act with a view to eliminating or neutralizing them
96” 
 
There is, however, a limit to this competence. In Case T-395/94 R, Atlantic Container Line 
AB and others v Commission of the European Communities, the question arose of whether 
the Commission could impose on the undertaking to inform third parties it had entered into 
contracts with, of their right to terminate or re-negotiate their agreements on the grounds 
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that they were based upon preconditions caused by the infringement. In this case, the court 
annulled this part of the decision, on the grounds that its reasons were not sufficiently well 
stated. The court did not explicitly imply whether the decision was within the Commissions 
competence or not. But, possibly, there is a correlation between the principle of 
proportionality, and the need for sufficient reasons. If there can be stated sufficient reasons 
to impose such a decision, it will most likely lie within the competence of the Commission. 
 
In the Ford
97
 case, the Court held that the Commission could not go any further in an 
interim decision than it could have done in addressing the infringement through a final 
decision. In the words of ECJ, the Commission could not make an interim decision, 
implying a separately enforceable order “which leaves no choice to the undertaking 
concerned”98, because “the interim measures must come within the framework of the final 
decision which may be adopted”99. 
 
A second principle is that there seems that the undertakings seem to have a large degree of 
freedom relating to how to end the infringement. From Court practice, this was remarked 
by the General Court in “Automec II”:  
 
“the Commission undoubtedly has the power to find that an infringement exists and to 
order the parties concerned to bring it to an end, but it is not for the Commission to impose 
upon the parties its own choice from among all the various potential courses of action 
which are in conformity with the Treaty.”100 
 
Several arguments are in favor of this. The principle of legality, that the undertakings have 
the competence - not to mention the physical means, and the motivation to do this as cost-
effectively as possible. Should the Commission itself issue very detailed regulations 
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regarding how to end the infringements, it would also intervene in the market, and de facto 
influence the business conduct of the undertaking contrary to the free market competition it 
tries to accommodate. The Automec II case was closed before the introduction of art. 7, but 
its principle is in accordance with general principles in EU law, and compatible, even 
supported by the wording of article 7, that indicate that the least burdensome alternative 
should be chosen, cfr. Above. 
 
The nature of the infringement is of importance when determining the extent of the 
Commissions power to impose remedies. The ECJ seems to have put emphasis on this, for 
example in Automec II, in which the court seems to have drawn a distinction between art. 
101 and art. 102 infringements. 
 
A question that arises is whether the Commission can impose structural remedies to 
terminate art. 101 infringements. The wording of former Regulation 17 /62 seen in 
connection with former court practice strongly suggests no. But in light of the new wording 
of art. 7, and the ECJ view that it is the effect, and not type of remedy that are material, 
there seem now to be a legal basis for adopting structural remedies for art. 101 
infringements. However, this is not likely, as it can hardly be imagined to be both 
necessary and proportional in relation to art. 7. But one situation it may be of use for is 
cutting through business transactions concealed as corporate structures, for example of the 
sort involving tax paradises. 
 
4.2.4 Fines 
Art. 7 decisions is the type of decision where the Commission may impose a fine. When 
imposing fines pursuant to article 23 (2) (a) of reg. 1/2003, the Commission “enjoys a wide 
margin of discretion”101. The process for setting the fine consists of several stages.  
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First, the commission sets a basic amount of the fine, using a method that involves a 
calculation of the value of the sales, and then finding the proportion that relates to the 
infringement.  
 
Second, the Commission takes into account circumstances that “result in an increase or 
decrease on the basic amount”102, such as the conduct of the undertaking during the 
procedure, deterrent effect etc. Then a statutory cap is imposed, which means that the fine 
cannot exceed 10% of the sum of the total turnover of each member active on the market, 
cfr. Art. 23 (2).  
 
After this, the Commission may apply leniency rules, as well as, in exceptional 
circumstances, take into consideration the undertakings ability to pay
103
. 
 
4.2.5 Summary of the Commission’s competence under art. 7 
 
In sum, the Commissions powers under art. 7 are characterized by: 
 
 That the Commission has a wide range of remedies 
 
 The extent of the effect of these remedies is closely related to the infringement in 
question, and goes only as far as to end the infringement. There is no basis for 
penalizing the undertakings by use of art. 7 remedies, only through fines. 
 
 When imposing the remedy, the starting point is freedom of contract. The 
undertakings should themselves decide, if possible, how to end the infringement. 
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4.3 Alternatives to art. 7 findings of infringement 
4.3.1 Article 9: Commitments 
Competition cases often proceed over several years and require vast resources both for the 
agency and the undertaking. Much is at stake for the undertakings involved, and they may 
therefore want to settle the case as quickly as possible. This is also so for the Commission, 
as the decision is not effective before the end of the proceedings, in which case it can 
already be to late to fully restore the infringement. Thus, both sides in a competition case 
have a motivation to settle the case instead of maintaining a full adversarial process. 
 
Also under the enforcement regime existing under regulation 17/62, cases were settled 
informally. There were, however, no coherent practice regarding how to do this, resulting 
in heterogeneous forms of settlements, and processes with little transparency and 
predictability for the parties involved. It is on this background art. 9 of regulation 1/2003 
was introduced. 
4.3.1.1 The requirements for making commitment decisions binding. 
The procedure leading to a commitment decision is set out in art. 9. From the wording, 
commitment decisions under art. 9 are only applicable where the Commission intends to 
adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be ended. This limits the Commission from 
accepting entirely pre-emptive commitments. In the case a commitment may be suitable; 
the undertaking concerned may offer commitments to “meet the concerns expressed to 
them by the Commission”. If the Commission finds it appropriate, the Commission may 
make the commitment binding upon the undertaking. 
 
From the wording, there is a condition for the use of commitment decisions that the 
proceedings has been initiated, and further, that the Commission has expressed concerns to 
the undertaking in its “preliminary assessment”. This ensures that the Commission does not 
misuse its powers by threatening undertakings into making commitments, but that genuine 
assessment lies behind the concerns expressed. 
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The Commissions use of commitment decisions may not be used for all cases. They are not 
intended for the gravest cases, where the Commission intends to impose a fine
104
. As the 
Commission must also find that there is an infringement, the use of commitments is limited 
from cases where there is no infringement, and the competition rules therefore are 
inapplicable. The use of commitment decisions is limited to the middle of these two 
extremes. 
 
The first question that arises is therefore to which extent the Commission must have 
established that there is an infringement in order to make commitments binding. The 
wording of article 9 prescribes settlements only in cases where the Commission “intends” 
to adopt a decision requiring that an “infringement” be brought to an end.  
 
The answer is most likely that the Commissions power is limited to cases where it 
reasonably finds it probable that there exists an infringement. The wording indicates is, as 
does the principle of legality. The use of the sanctions must also be seen in connection with 
the purpose of the rules, namely to end the infringements. Therefore, the Commission may 
not make commitments binding in situations where it deems the commitment in question 
would imply a more desirable solution, if it not at the same time finds it more probable than 
not probable that there has been an infringement. Otherwise, the Commission would 
intervene in the market in a way not compatible with its powers. This question may also be 
posed as a question of the proportionality of the commitment, which will be treated in 
further detail below. 
 
Regarding the limitation of the severity of the infringement, Commitment decisions may 
not be imposed where the Commission “intends to impose a fine”. This wording may seem 
to limit the scope of settlements considerably, as there is imposed a fine in many 
competition cases. However, the Commission seems to have read this restriction quite 
flexibly, though, and there are several cases in which settlements were used, that could 
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have justified a fine105. As long as the practice concerning commitments is within 
reasonable limits, this may be a sound approach. If a fine were completely excluded, it 
would provide little incentive for the undertaking concerned to offer a commitment106. In 
practice, the restriction seem only to apply where the infringement in question is serious, 
and qualifies for a severe fine107 
4.3.1.2 The nature and extent of the commitment decision 
A further question that arises is how far the Commissions power goes in make commitment 
offers binding upon the undertakings.  Regarding decisions under art. 7, it is clear that they 
cannot go any further than to end the infringement. But can the Commission make binding 
an offer that goes further than the conditions of necessity and proportionality requires under 
art. 7? 
 
Several arguments are in favor of extending the Commissions powers under art. 9 as 
opposed to art. 7. The offer is voluntary, and, given that the undertakings in question are 
always relatively big, they have access to adequate counsel
108
. Commitment decisions are 
also, as it is now, relatively transparent process, with several procedural safeguards.  
 
On the other hand, it is clear that abusive use of the power to make commitments binding 
upon the undertakings would not be in accordance with the purpose of the competition 
rules, and imply unjust intervention in community markets. The undertaking may feel 
pressured to settle, especially as the expected fines can be enormous, and as well as other 
aspects such as the increasing cost of bad publicity
109
. 
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Indeed, court practice has indicated that also art. 9 decisions, though voluntary, has to be 
proportionate in order to be legal, cfr. Case T-170/06 Alrosa Company Ltd, para. 92. Here, 
the court states that  
 
“although Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 does not, unlike Article 7(1), refer to the 
principle of proportionality, the Commission is obliged to comply with that principle when 
it adopts decisions on the basis of Article 9.” 
 
And further that “even though the Commission has a margin of discretion this does not 
relieve it of its obligation to comply with the principle of proportionality”110. The review of 
proportionality is an objective review
111
. However, the Commission retains certain 
discretion as to the application of the remedies, because the court limits the review of the 
Commissions more complex economic assessment to more manifest errors
112
. The elements 
of the assessment of proportionality is necessity and appropriateness 
 
This judgment by the General Court implies a quite strict principle of proportionality in 
relation to art. 9 decisions. This implies that the range of remedies available under art. 9 
can go no further than the Commission could anyway impose, under art. 7. This will de 
facto narrow the scope of art. 9 further, because the remedy in addition to lying within the 
borders of what the Commission could have decided under art. 7 also will have to be 
suggested by the undertaking. 
 
The ECJ has not yet decided in the appeal case, but AG Kokott has delivered her opinion in 
the case Commission v. Alrosa (C-441/07). In this opinion she deviates from the 
argumentation of the General Court, holding that art. 9 serve a distinctly different purpose 
than art. 7, by being more of a tool addressing concerns over competition for the future, and 
by far more characterized by the needs of procedural economy than art. 7. 
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Regarding the assessment of appropriateness, she holds that the Commission has a wider 
margin of discretion in such cases, and that “the assessment of alternatives is not intended 
to require any extensive or lengthy investigations or evaluation”113. 
 
In the assessment of proportionality regarding the necessity, Kokott holds that this must be 
presumed in relation to the undertaking offering the commitment, and only needs to be 
assessed in relation to third parties. This implies a wider scope for Commission, as the 
undertaking may offer a better remedy in the eyes of the Commission than it otherwise 
could have been achieved by art. 7. This widens the scope of the use of settlement, since 
the Commission does not necessarily have to have competence to decide the remedy, once 
it is offered by the undertaking. 
 
Another question that arises is whether the commission can impose structural remedies 
under art. 9. The wording itself does not distinguish between structural and behavioral 
remedies. If the undertaking concerned deems a commitment with structural effects most 
desirable, there seem to be nothing hindering the Commission from making such 
commitments binding, which has been done several times
114
, and never contested by 
others. 
4.3.1.3 Legal effect: 
The commitment made binding upon the undertaking by the Commission corresponds to an 
obligation for the undertaking involved to act in accordance with the obligation, which may 
be binding for a specific period only. This obligation can be enforced by fines cfr. Art. 23 
2. (C) of reg. 1/2003. 
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The proceeding is terminated, and the Commission concludes that there are no longer any 
grounds for action”, cfr. Art 9, but the Commission does not find an infringement. This 
limits the effect a commitment decision has on clarifying the law, and acting as a 
precedent. The Commission can only re-open the case on very limited grounds, such as 
material change of facts, misleading information or the undertaking act contrary to its 
commitment. 
4.3.2 Settlements under art. 10a of reg. 773/2004 
Settlements under art 10a of reg 773/2004 find their legal basis in Commission decisions 
under art. 7 of reg 1/2003. The settlement entails a reduction in the fine following from the 
decision cfr. Art. 23. The settlement procedure is only relevant for cartel cases. The 
procedure differs from the leniency regime in that it is only used when the proceedings 
have been initiated, and first when the parties are “prepared to acknowledge their 
participation in a cartel”115. 
 
The settlement procedure is initiated by the Commission, when it, after sufficient 
investigation finds that the case will require a decision in accordance with art. 7 and 23, 
and finds that the case could be appropriate for settlement discussions , and if this is the 
case, explores the parties interest in a settlement, by “set a time limit within which the 
parties may indicate in writing that they are prepared to engage in settlement discussions 
with a view to possibly introducing settlement submissions”, cfr. Art 10a. In deciding 
whether or not the case is suitable for settlements, the Commission has a wide discretion.   
 
If the parties express their interest in a settlement, and when the settlement discussions lead 
to a “common understanding regarding the scope of the potential objections and the 
estimation if the likely fines to be imposed”, the Commission may set a final time-limit for 
a settlement submission116. 
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The settlement submission must, inter alia, clearly indicate the party’s acknowledgement of 
liability for the infringement, an indication of the maximum amount the undertaking could 
accept under the procedure, and the party’s agreement to receive a decision pursuant to art. 
7 and 23 of reg. 1/2003. Following this, and as in a normal fully adversarial process, the 
Commission will issue a statement of objections also in the settlement procedure. 
 
If the statement reflects the party’s settlement submission, it should confirm this to the 
Commission. But also where the party does not deem the statement of objections to reflect 
the settlement submission, the Commission maintains the right to adopt the statement. 
 
Upon the Commissions reception a confirmation, it may adopt a final decision pursuant to 
article 7 and 23 of reg 1/2003. If the undertaking does not confirm the statement, the 
Commission may in any case return to the normal procedural rules, but the 
acknowledgements made by the parties cannot be used as evidence against them117. 
4.3.2.1 The legal effect 
The legal effect of a procedural settlement under art 10a of reg 773/2004 is quite similar to 
those under art 7. The result process is still the finding of an infringement, and a fine is 
imposed. The difference lies in the reduction of the fine. This reduction is, in accordance 
with Commission Notice 2008/167/05 2. 32. 10%, which is subtracted from the total 
amount of the fine after the 10% statutory cap has been applied. 
4.3.3 Informal settlements 
Reg. 1/2003 do not directly regulate alternatives to the aforementioned sanctions, and the 
enforcement agency’s discretion as to whether or not to use the rules imply that there is 
some room for alternatives. Before the introduction of regulation 1/2003, this was how 
settlements were concluded. And though one of the objectives of the regulation was to 
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make such informal settlements part of a more transparent and organized procedure, the 
Commission may likely still choose use its competence to conclude informal settlements
118
. 
4.3.4 Finding of inapplicability, art. 10 
According to art. 10 of regulation 1/2003, the Commission may, where “Community public 
interest” relating to the enforcement  of the competition rules so requires “by decision” find 
that art 101 or art 102 is not applicable to the agreement, either because the conditions for 
finding an infringement is not fulfilled, or because the criteria for the exemption in 101 (3) 
is satisfied. Firms do not have the right to ask for such a decision, and the provision is 
rather intended to ensure harmonious enforcement of competition law across the union, 
than to provide legal certainty in for the undertaking in question
119
 
 
In the “Report on Competition Policy”, 2005, the Commission set out the criteria for 
deciding whether or not to proceed with the case. These criteria encompassed, in short, the 
significance on the market, the complexity of the investigation, the possibility of bringing 
the case before a national court, importance of other areas of Community or national law 
affected by the conduct, whether the case is a single incident, or whether there are many 
like it, and the cessation or modification of the conduct since the time of a complaint. 
Recital 14 of regulation 1/2003 indicates that the provision is to be used only in 
“exceptional cases”. 
 
Generally, the Commission will indicate which of these criteria it relied on in the finding of 
inapplicability, but as in most matters regarding competition law, the Commission has a 
wide discretion on finding a case inapplicable.  
4.4 The choices of the participants in the proceeding 
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On basis of the outline of the procedure, we can outline the stages of choice in the legal 
dispute between the enforcement agency and the undertaking as consisting of the following 
stages120: 
 
Table 1: Stages in the sanction system 
Stage 1: The undertaking decides whether to infringe or not based upon expected gain 
Stage 2: The enforcement agency starts investigation of the undertaking 
Stage 3: The undertaking decides whether or not to offer a commitment 
Stage 4: The enforcement agency decides whether or not to make the commitment offer binding, 
find the case inapplicable, or to start the adversarial procedure (by claiming and infringement 
and/or a fine). 
Stage 5: The undertaking/third parties decides whether to contest the agency’s decision in the 
court system 
Stage 6: Trial 
Stage 7: The parties decide whether or not to appeal the case 
Stage 8: Appeal trial 
Stage 9: Implementation of remedy 
 
In a game three, this gives us the following depiction of the road from infringement to 
implementation, where the players’ different choices result in either implementation  or 
the case is ended without result (End)
121
: 
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Figure 1: Game tree 
 
 
 
The analyses in this thesis concerns primarily stages 3 and 4, i.e. when the Commission has 
gathered sufficient evidence, and is able to assess the case, and even may have received 
specific offers of commitments from the undertakings. 
 
The model may to some extent be applicable also on later stages of the road to 
implementation of the remedy. Further, given that the agency takes ex ante effects into 
account when deciding on its remedy, also potential “stage 1” situations become elements 
of the agency’s consideration, for example regarding the effect of prevention. 
5 The economic cost of infringement:  
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will look closer upon the economic cost of infringement. I will comment 
upon how one generally may quantify the harm done to society by competition 
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infringements, the aim of competition law, and the economic assessment of the damage 
caused by competition infringements with regard to static and dynamic efficiency.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish more accurately what the competition enforcer 
primarily seeks to reduce by enforcing the competition rules, namely the economic cost of 
infringements. This chapter does not, however, describe how competition policy has been 
operationalized through positive law, as in TFEU art. 101 and 102. 
5.2 Quantifying harm caused by competition infringements 
The damage, D, to society caused by competition infringements can be said to be the 
difference
A
 between the value for the society of a market without the infringement and the 
                                                 
A)  
Damage of O offences is therefore given by 
 
(1) 
 
Where H (O) is harm and G (O) is the gain caused by the infringement. The damage 
caused by a single infringement, j, which is the situation for the enforcement agency, 
will thus be given as: 
(2) 
 
Since competition offences require precautions, concealments etc. by the 
undertaking committing them, it can be assumed that the marginal gain for the 
undertakings is diminishing with additional offences ( Becker (1968)p173).   
(3) 
 
 (Common sense would indicate this to be true, as the cost of the “marginal cost” of 
further infringement increases. It is also assumed by Becker (1968) p. 173.); 
Footnote continues on next page → 
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value in the market when the infringement is committed122. As such, a very wide number of 
anti-competitive behaviors may possibly be causing lessened total value. 
 
When measuring the effects individuals actions have on the aggregated social welfare in 
the field of competition law, the measurement scale will usually be monetary, or can be 
described using monetary terms. This is different from for example use of law and 
economics to describe violent crime. In these cases harm is often far greater than the 
benefit.  
 
Also in relation to an economic analysis, a common scale is needed. As established in the 
introduction of the thesis, I assume, for analytical convenience, that the various effects of 
infringements are of monetary value. 
 
The damage caused by competition can take many forms: It can manifest itself present or in 
the future, in terms of more expensive goods for the consumers, in form of less production 
of goods or services than desirable or in form of slower technological development than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
5.3 The scope of the enforcers assessment of the economic cost 
It is the main aim of competition law to facilitate a business life that maximizes effective 
and contributive competition, and counteract actions that cause damage to the society as a 
whole. And it is the main aim of the competition enforcement agency to enforce this policy. 
 
But since competition infringements can manifest themselves in many different ways, the 
competition authority cannot take every thinkable effect into account when enforcing the 
competition environment. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
122
 Becker (1968), p 173, defines damage as the difference between the harm and gain, in this thesis I use 
aggregate value of a market, this amounts to much of the same, but in a competition setting, the total welfare 
standard is limited by concerns over consumers, see below. 
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There is a border between the development of society, dynamic competition and 
competition infringement that is difficult to estimate and enforce, and that becomes vaguer 
the farther away we look. Effects concerning the far future are almost impossible to 
estimate.  
 
There must therefore be a limit to which cases the competition authority takes into account 
in its practical enforcement. In relation to this thesis, the natural frame for the enforcement 
agency is to only take into account the effects that are related within an adequate proximity 
to an actual competition law infringement. In other words, the competition rules, that 
constitute a room of possible infringements, must be the starting point when the 
competition authority seeks to estimate and reduce the damage. 
 
This is also in line with the general mandate of the competition enforcer, namely mainly to 
deal with actual infringements. The Commission also has regulatory powers, and it can 
initiate investigations on its own initiative, but the basis to act in relation to a specific 
undertaking and impose an enforcement decision comes from the enforcement procedure.  
 
5.4 The aim of competition law 
Much of the literature in law and economics, an example being Becker in “Crime and 
punishment”123, is centered on finding the optimal level of deterrence, in order to reduce the 
loss sustained by society. In those analyses, the ultimate objective is minimizing cost by for 
example deterring crime. Crime, per definition, is unwanted by society, and any reduction 
will therefore contribute to social welfare
124
. 
 
With regard to competition law, there are stakeholders that represent a wide specter of 
interests, where some of the interests are conflicting. Producers are interested in becoming 
                                                 
123
 Becker (1968). 
124
 Which in this thesis, for analytical convenience, is assumed to be of monetary value. 
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as profitable as possible, while consumers want low prices. The model of a free market in 
equilibrium, for example, will not take into account the distribution of the value. Damage 
to consumer surplus could, for example, represent only a loss for the consumers of that 
specific market, not the society as a whole, because the producers become better off 
 
The question therefore arises as to which standard should be used to describe the damage 
caused by competition infringements? In other words: Should distribution effects also 
being taken into account when determining what the damage is caused? 
 
In EU competition law, consumer welfare is an important aim for the competition 
enforcement125. The predominant view, stated by the Commission both regarding art. 101
126
 
and art. 102
127
, is that consumer welfare is the principal aim of the enforcement agency. 
This is also the predominant view in the United States
128
. 
 
However, this is not undisputed, and some scholars disagree, and argue that a wider 
consideration for public policy is also important to the consideration
129
. For example 
Østbye
130
 refers to the aim of the EU as a whole, of which a central element is creating a 
well-functioning internal market, and thus is an important consideration
131
. And while 
consumer protection is the overall aim of art. 102, its operative scope is often the conflicts 
between undertakings. As far as can be reconciled with the concern for consumer welfare, 
also overall social welfare therefore seems to be the aim of the agency. 
 
It is also worth to note that the term consumer welfare can also be interpreted in several 
ways, referring either to fair and just distribution of assets or to efficiency: Especially in 
                                                 
125
 Competition law (2008) p. 19. 
126
 Article 81 (3) guideline para 13, regarding art. 81. 
127
 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings para 19. 
128
 Antitrust law and economics (2004). 
129
 See for example Article 81 EC and Public Policy (2009). 
130
 Konkurranserett (2008). 
131
 Konkurranserett (2008), though he refers to EC, presently EU. 
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US, the term consumer welfare tend to refer more to efficient use of resources than the 
distribution of resources
132
 
 
Regarding this thesis, in relation to further considerations regarding gain, payoffs, and 
other effects related to reducing the cost of competition infringements, the aim of primarily 
enforcing consumer welfare, and overall welfare as long as it is not damaging for consumer 
welfare, should be applied when measuring the different consequences against each other. 
 
5.5 Discrepancies in harm caused and the legal basis to act 
The agency seeks to remedy the harm caused. Nonetheless, there may be discrepancies 
between the harm caused and the basis to act, which effectively impairs the agency from 
seeking to remedy the complete harm caused. Even if damage can be measured accurately, 
damage alone is not sufficient to state a competition infringement. EU law is bound by the 
principle of legality, which is an underlying principle of EU law133, in addition to the 
regulations that require proportionality with regard to sanctions134 
 
These rules only operationalize the underlying policy behind the rules, and in some cases 
discrepancies may arise regarding the damage actually caused, and the damage that there is 
legal basis to sanction. The enforcement agency is, in such a situation, obliged impose 
sanctions that only cover the infringements of the rules, not the damage as a whole in 
accordance with the principle of legality. The legal basis thus constrains the economic 
assessment, and the agency must seek to maximize the effect of the remedy within the 
constraints of the legal basis. 
 
It is not sufficient to establish that the action of the undertaking is harmful to the society. It 
is also necessary to have a legal basis to act against the undertaking. Even though an 
undertaking has caused damage to society through its actions, the enforcement agency can 
                                                 
132
 Konkurranserett (2008). P28. 
133
 Cfr. TFEU art 5. 
134
 E.g. art. 7 of reg. 1/2003. 
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only impose sanctions with legal basis in norms introduced before the action took place135. 
EU law does, in art. 101 and 102, set up a wide legal basis for sanctions against infringers 
of those rules.  
 
In practice, the requirements regarding evidence, which requires the EA to effectively 
demonstrate that there has been an infringement, will rule out the lesser infringement, and 
only the more clear-cut damages to consumer surplus will be subject to a process. 
 
The opposite situation may also arise; there is legal basis for sanctions, even though no 
damage to the surplus of the society can be effectively demonstrated. In these cases it is 
sufficient that an infringement has been found, and it is not necessary to establish that harm 
to the society has been already made. In many instances it is not only the damage that is 
prohibited, but also to willfully create an opportunity to do harm to the society, for example 
by crushing competitors, such as art. 102.  
 
The reasons for these rules are to make competition enforcement more effective, as clear 
damage to consumer welfare cannot always be easily demonstrated. Also, in case of 
abusing market power, it may be late to implement remedies if a competitor is already 
crushed out of the market. In these situations the enforcement agency may take what 
actions it deems necessary to restore the competitiveness. This is a form of enforcement 
that may be pre-emptive to the harm actually inflicted. In these cases, the agency’s 
reduction of loss is pre-emptive. 
 
5.6 Economic assessment of damage caused by competition infringements 
Damage caused by competition infringements can be assessed in a number of ways. But 
usually, the two main categories of assessing damage can be grouped into. First, static 
                                                 
135
 This follows from the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 7, and the EU charter art. 49. 
Though these primarily refer to criminal activity, and it may be unclear whether a competition infringement 
constitutes a criminal act, the principle of non-retroactivity will most likely be given substantial weight. 
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damage, i.e. the damage that is caused by the total surplus for the society being lower than 
it would otherwise be, calculated with a basis in a free market model, given essentially the 
same conditions. Second, dynamic efficiency, which takes into account that the conditions 
of the market place may develop. This makes the effects hard to estimate, especially with 
regard to infringements. A dominating monopoly could lead to better technology, and thus 
cheaper goods produced for the consumers. On the other hand, fierce competition may lead 
to even better improvements. Dynamic efficiency is therefore harder to calculate than static 
efficiency. 
 
One could say that while static models may best assess the loss caused by competition 
infringements in retrospect, the dynamic models assess the effects of the competition 
infringement will have in the future.  
 
With regard to the use of economic theory in assessing the damage inflicted by competition 
infringements, the following description of static and dynamic efficiency is not necessarily 
exactly the same economic considerations that will be used by the competition enforcer.  
 
It is a general principle in competition law enforcement, already established in 1899 in the 
important US judgment “Addyston Pipe”136, that the best available economic theory should 
be used when determining competition infringements
137
. The following description will 
therefore serve as a general example rather of the economic measurement of competition 
infringements than accurately depicting the economic reasoning of the Commission. 
 
5.6.1 Static damage caused by competition infringements. 
Modern competition law is heavily influenced by the microeconomic thinking inherent in 
the free market model, and current application of competition assumes markets to function 
                                                 
136
 Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
137
 Konkurranserett (2008)p 54. 
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in accordance with neoclassical economic theory
138
. The model was i.a. the theoretical 
reference for the Committee on the Norwegian Competition act in 1993
139
, and is still an 
important reference. 
 
In an enforcement setting, modeling the effect of infringements is important to assess the 
damage the agency seeks to repair. But also with regard to the other effects of enforcement, 
such as transactions costs, externalities etc., an understanding of the model make these 
effects easier to understand clearly. 
 
Analyses of static damage using the free market models are intended to describe a market, 
usually in relation to a perfect functioning market, in which the allocation of resources to 
produce the goods is coherent with consumer demand, and thus, that the appropriate 
amount of resources is allocated to the production.  
 
As mentioned above, damage is the difference between the aggregate values of the market 
for the society with the infringement, compared to the aggregate value of the market 
without the infringement. Since value is not easily measured, for most practical purposes 
the free market model serves as the basis for the calculation of the damage the infringement 
is causing.  
 
If the condition of the model is fulfilled, in a utopian society, in which all goods are sold on 
a free market, under the conditions of a perfect market, the allocation of resources in the 
society will be consistent with the maximization of value. 
 
Competition infringements in relation to the free market model corresponds to deadweight 
loss and possibly the loss of consumer surplus
140
 The free market model gives a snapshot at 
the market, and provides information of the supply and demand of the market in question, 
                                                 
138
 Konkurranserett (2008). 
139
 ”Konkurranselovutvalget”, cfr. Fra Konkurransepolitikk til konkurranserett. (1998) p 48. 
140
 Cfr. The discussion above the aim of competition law. 
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for example on a given day. When the conditions for perfect competition are present, the 
price will, according to the free market model, end up at the optimal level that maximizes 
welfare for the society. A completely free market is dependent on a number of different 
factors141. It is an important aim for the agency to ensure the presence of these factors in the 
market, and these factors are often reflected in competition decisions. 
 
 First, the specific market is supposed to sell homogenous goods. In a free market all 
the goods sold are homogenous, and there are no perceivable differences in quality. 
In other words, the buyers are indifferent between the goods of two sellers as long 
as it is the same amount. 
 
 Second, the participants must be price givers or price takers. If the individual party 
may influence the price (as in a monopoly), the price setting may not be entirely 
corresponding to consumer demand, and a less optimal amount of resources may be 
allocated to the market. Practically, this can only be achieved if the parties in the 
market are so small that their behavior has no effect on the total price of the market. 
Such a market is referred to as an “atomistic market”. 
 
 Third, there has to be freedom of contract, and the parties must be able to enter into 
contracts with whoever they want.  
 
 Fourth, all parties must be in good faith, and there must be no risk of deals that are 
not honored. 
 
 Fifth, all parties must have full information. If this is not the case, some parties may 
use price information to their own advantage, and to achieve a higher than market 
price. The producers must be able to instantaneously adapt production to the new 
information. 
                                                 
141
 Rettsøkonomi (2008) p. 76. 
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 Sixth, there must be no transaction costs. If the consumers have transaction costs, 
the demand curve will shift correspondingly to the left, meaning that consumer 
demand at every price level is lower than the demand curve would otherwise 
indicate, because the consumers are willing to buy less when transaction costs are 
high. Also the producers have may have transaction costs, which shifts the supply 
curve to the left, meaning that the producers will produce less goods at a given 
market price. 
 
The market demand is given by the curve labeled demand below, this is the horizontal 
aggregation of how much of the good each customer is willing to purchase at the market 
within a given timeframe. The market supply is given by the curve labeled supply. This is 
the horizontal aggregation of the amount all the suppliers are willing to produce and send to 
the market at each given price. 
 
Figure 2. Free market equilibrium 
 
 
 
Demand Supply 
Quantity 
P
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ce
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The equilibrium is in the intersection between the demand and the supply curve. Without 
government interference, and in a market where some of the buyers would be willing to 
purchase (usually a smaller amount of) goods on the market. They can now buy the good 
for less money. The difference between the sums they were willing to pay, and the sum 
they paid is called the consumer surplus. 
 
Assuming rational and well informed consumers, the price they are willing to pay are equal 
to the value they will gain from the purchase. This is an important assumption regarding 
the ability of the market to increase value. With some consumers willing to pay more than 
the market price, yet still assuming the price to be equal on the market, consumer surplus 
arises. In the case of consumer surplus, the customers willing to pay the most get more 
value than they actually paid for. A consumer with a fairly inelastic demand may for 
example be willing to give €20 for a good with a price of €10. Thus the consumer gets €10 
in consumer surplus. Since the consumer is rational, it has gained €10’s equivalent of value 
for society. 
 
Correspondingly, the producers experience suppliers’ surplus because they were willing to 
sell some of the goods on the market more cheaply than the price they obtained, and they 
gained a higher price for some of their goods. 
 
There are several categories of competition infringements. As we remember, the free-
market model consists of a supply and a demand curve. These curves are effects of the 
choices of the participants in the market, and mostly, the participants can only affect these 
curves indirectly. Roughly speaking, competition infringements consist in manipulating 
either supply or demand, in order to create an unfair advantage for the market participant(s) 
in question.  
 
In the following are the main categories of competition infringements: 
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5.6.1.1 Manipulating supply 
A producer is, basically free to choose whether to produce, and how much to produce. But 
in certain cases, the decisions of a producer regarding how much goods to produce to a 
given market severs surplus for the society in a such a way (especially for consumers) that 
the society wants to forbid them. 
 
A monopolist is the classical example of a producer that is able to regulate the supply in 
such a way that he can optimize revenues by acting as a price giver. In short, a monopolist 
seeks to maximize revenues, given the demand curve on the market. If the monopolist 
cannot price-discriminate, all units must have the same price. The monopolist must 
therefore strike the balance between selling few units at a higher price and selling many 
units at a low price. A rational monopoly maximizes revenue by choosing the output where 
the total marginal revenue is 0, at top of the total revenue curve142. 
 
Acting or pricing as a monopoly is not forbidden in principle. It is only when the 
monopolist prices in a way that implies misuse of market power.  
 
The typical infringement that consists in manipulating supply is restricting supply to 
achieve higher prices. This type of infringements may in some cases apply to monopolies, 
but almost always to cartels. In fact, a perfect cartel prices like a monopolist143. The 
restriction of the rules regard the agreement forming the cartel (such agreements are 
forbidden in EU law, art. 101). Similar behavior, which does not outright constitute a 
cartel, can be conscious parallelism, where the producers follow each other’s price setting 
closely, as a form of implicit agreement (which is also forbidden). 
 
Also “over-supplying”, by providing more goods at a given price than the marginal cost 
should imply can constitute an infringement. This is typically done by bigger and 
financially strong companies to crush competitors off the market, by smoking them out 
                                                 
142
 Microeconomics (2006) p. 410. 
143
 Microeconomics (2006) p. 430  
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until they withdraw from the market. Thus, the bigger company can gain a more lucrative 
monopoly situation. While the rules regarding predatory pricing mostly is intended to put 
an end to bigger companies gaining price-setting power, it is important to remember that 
over-supply in itself leads to more ineffective resource allocation, and consequently a 
deadweight loss, that should be considered in addition to the loss of the competitor and the 
potential loss due to higher future prices. 
 
Also other types of contractual mechanisms can contribute to manipulating the supply from 
what would have been the case with a free market equilibrium. For example dividing 
territories, which gives the different parties price-setting power over a smaller market, bid 
rigging in tender offers, refusals to deal (which can indirectly have consequences for 
example for competitors ability to supply) etc.  
  
  63 
Illustrations 
Figure 3: The reference: A free market in equilibrium 
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Figure 4: Perfect price setting power (illustrated by a  monopoly, or a perfect cartel) 
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 Conscious parallelism 
 Cartels 
 Price fixing 
 Bid rigging  
 Refusal to deal (ex. Group boycott) 
 Predatory pricing (creating price-setting power for the supplier) 
 Exclusive dealing 
 
5.6.1.2 Manipulating demand 
Competition infringements can also consist in manipulating demand. Typically this is done 
by using a high market share on one market to increase the demand on another market, via 
bundling or tying. In such a case the consumer cannot buy the item he or she wants without 
also buying the bundled item. The demand for the bundled item, of that producer 
specifically, increases more than the real marginal value for the consumer, represented by 
the original demand curve, would indicate.  
 
This damages both the other producers on that market, that are not able to sell their product 
at the realistic demand price, and the consumers, who have to buy an overly expensive 
item. Thus they receive less value per monetary unit from the transaction than they would 
if they could buy the product alone. 
 
There becomes a deadweight loss because more resources than necessary are used to 
produce goods on the market, resources that would result in greater value for society if 
used to produce other types of goods. 
 
Also misleading marketing would contribute to the demand curve being shifted right, i.e. 
more customers would be willing to pay a higher price than their value gained from the 
transaction should indicate which would lead to lower aggregate value. 
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Figure 5. Illustration of demand manipulation 
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5.6.2 The time factor 
The free market model gives only a snap-shot at the market at a given time, the more time a 
market participant is able to deviate from the free market equilibrium, the more damage 
society will incur. The harm, measured statically, is therefore given by multiplying the 
deadweight loss (if measuring total welfare), and/or damage to consumer surplus (if 
consumer welfare is given weight), i.e. infringement multiplied by the appropriate time 
factor representing the time frame of the market equilibrium. In other words, the time in 
which the infringement consists have a great impact on the overall economic cost of the 
infringement. 
 
 
5.6.3 Dynamic damage caused by competition infringements 
Our world changes in a fast pace, and because of i.a. technological development, markets 
conditions change. The static models most widely used in economic theory do not take 
these developments fully into account. Nonetheless, the impact of these effects requires 
them to be adequately addressed. Both the Microsoft and Intel cases, the commission has 
referred to dynamic competition as an important reason for initiating the cases
144
 
 
The question of dynamic efficiency can be posed as 1) if there are any dynamic effects on 
the market at all, and, if so, 2 )what weight should be given to the dynamic changes. 
 
Regarding the first problem, several objective parameters could be used in assessing 
whether the industry is subject to dynamic change or not. The very essence of dynamic 
efficiency is technological development, which would have to be reflected in these 
parameters: 
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 Microsoft, IP/09/1941, and Intel MEMO/09/400. 
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Product lifecycle145, i.e. analyzing how mature a market for a certain product is could be 
one parameter. The more mature the market, the less likely great dynamic improvements 
will be, the newer the product, the more likely it is that new technological improvements 
will find place. Also the time-span of the total life cycle can indicate the probability of 
dynamic effects. The market for grain is, for example, subject to developments, and has 
certainly undergone a major transformation the last thousand years. But relatively speaking 
it is a mature market consisting of homogenous products that changes little every year. On 
the other hand, manufacturing computer processors, the developments over a single year 
alone may be immense. 
 
It is few cases where dynamic efficiency is been explicitly discussed by the competition 
authority. But in most of these, Research & Development seems to be used as a parameter 
to indicate whether the industry is subject to dynamic change. In for example the 
Jotun/Nodest146 case, the effects on R&D was considered, likewise in Aker/Euroc147. A 
more objective parameter that can be used could for example be R&D as a percentage of 
product cost. In e.g. the medicine industry, the drug itself may be quite cheap to produce, 
but the R&D cost high, resulting in much of the R&D cost being reflected in the price of 
the product. This industry is an example of an industry where dynamic improvements play 
an important role. 
 
Regarding the second, the weight which should be placed on consideration for dynamic 
efficiency  is strongly related to proximity in time. The farther away one looks, the more 
uncertain the effect will be. There should therefore be placed less weight on effects of 
dynamic efficiency that lies far into the future. 
 
Another perspective regarding how to achieve dynamic efficiencies, is that a competition 
policy ensuring properly working competition routines, well-functioning markets, and 
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 As used by Levitt (1965). 
146
 Case published in Norsk Pristidende 8/92. 
147
 Case published by the Norwegian competition authority, 95/1175. 
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predictability for market stakeholders is one of the most important ways to facilitate 
development. In such a perspective, the enforcement agency should rather focus on 
facilitating the future, than predicting it.  
 
6 Reducing the cost of infringements 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the legal proceedings have been outlined, the Commission’s 
choice of decisions have been clarified, the economic frameworks have been introduced, 
and the damage to the society caused by competition infringements, which it is the aim of 
the enforcement agency to reduce, has been described. 
 
In this chapter, I will analyze how the enforcement agency may reduce the cost of 
competition infringements. I will establish the objective function of the agency and 
describe how the agency may maximize its output by assessing the marginal gain of 
imposing a decision in relation to the use of resources. This analysis will serve as a starting 
point to analyze the impact of the introduction of settlements, and describing in which 
cases the Commission should use different types of decisions, i.e. art. 7, 9 and 10a 
decisions. 
 
This analysis is basically a cost benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analyses imply weighing the 
expected benefits of a contemplated action against the expected costs. If the expected 
benefit outweighs the cost, the action should be done. Making decisions on this basis, when 
the player contemplates the consequences for the entire society, corresponds to the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion148. The agency’s decision must therefore be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 
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 Rettsøkonomi (2008) p. 112. 
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6.2 The objective function 
The enforcement agency has several ways of achieving its goal of minimizing the loss 
caused by competition infringements. One of its techniques may be to influence the making 
of laws
149
, or by other means affect the expected payoff for the undertakings that 
potentially can infringe
150
. Such general policies are important for overall deterrence. 
Moreover, the agency also uses its resources for administration, and other activities such as 
education and participating in political processes. 
 
In addition to this, the enforcement agency also does “core enforcement tasks”, such as 
detection, gathering of evidence and prosecution
151
. While there also exists a correlation 
between the deterrence effect from non-core enforcement activities (influencing the rules, 
for example, can have a vast effect compared to the amount of resources used to draft it), 
these effects are more difficult to measure than those core enforcement activities. 
 
In the following, I therefore concentrate my thesis around the core enforcement tasks. This 
type of enforcement also relates more directly to the scope of this thesis. I choose to treat 
legal rules as exogenous in relation to the choice of type of decision. In fact they act as 
constraints limiting the choice of potential actions against infringers, due to the principle of 
legality. 
 
The deterrent effect from enforcement activities is the net reduction of the loss for society 
caused by the competition infringement. The core activities are only a part of the specter of 
enforcement activities, but their aim is the same as the total aim of the agency, namely to 
reduce total loss. Effective deterrence, however, also implies a social cost of punishment. 
This is the cost of the infringer (and third parties connected to the infringer) bears because 
                                                 
149
 In fact, the Commission has the responsibility for proposing new legislation, cfr. TEU art. 17 (2). 
150
 By for example influencing expected sanction or probability of being caught. 
151
 In relation to the economic analysis, the word “prosecution” is, for simplicity, sometimes used to indicate 
those cases where the Commission initiates the proceedings, with or without this resulting in a final decision.  
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of the penalty of the enforcement decision. This cost should not be so high that the 
reduction of loss is outweighed by the cost of punishments, which also may be borne by 
third parties innocent of the infringement
152
.  
 
The objective function153 of the enforcement agency is therefore to reduce damage as 
effectively as possible, without causing a too high loss due to the social cost of punishment, 
externalities etc
B
. 
 
This objective function must be fulfilled, under the constraint of the total level of cost, C. 
Within this given cost-frame, the agency may choose how to distribute its resources. The 
cost-frame is given by governmental grant, and is not decided by the enforcement agency.  
 
In a long term perspective, the total level of cost spent on the enforcement agency has an 
impact of the total level of deterrence
154
. But in the short term constrained choice addressed 
                                                 
152
 This is one of the reasons it is not viable to raise penalties enormously to achieve better effect of 
prevention, the cost of punishment would be higher than the damage it avoided. 
153
 This definition is approximately used by Becker (1968), though on an overall setting, where also the 
spending on enforcement is taken into account. It is also almost the same as OECDs definition, see OECD 
(2008) p. 3 
B)
  
The objective function is thus to reduce loss, L, as a function of the number of 
offences (O): 
 
(4)  
Where Loss, L (O) is the sum of the damage D (O) and the social cost of punishment by imposing the 
sanction, S (O), as functions of the number of offences, O. 
 
154
 See for example Gary Beckers seminal article on this: Crime and punishment (1968). 
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in this thesis, the cost frame is given
C
. It is therefore the distribution of resources within the 
frame of cost that is crucial to this analysis.  
 
6.3 Distributing resources optimally: The “production output” of the agency 
An economic choice is basically about comparing the return on resources that a choice will 
yield, and this is exactly what the enforcement agency seeks by choosing the optimal type 
of decision. The agency should spend its resources in a way that implies the highest 
reduction of loss, i.e. the highest “enforcement effect”.  
 
The enforcement agency seeks to handle as many cases as possible, in order to reduce 
damage by remedying as many cases as possible. However, the resources of the agency are 
limited, and it can only use it on a limited number of cases to ensure proper dealing with 
them. The budget constraint therefore implies that the agency must select which cases to 
prosecute. 
 
It is because the agency has limited resources, the distribution of these resources affect the 
effect of enforcement. And it is this selection that actualizes the choice of the type of 
decision, and the proceeding leading to it, in order to enforce optimally. 
 
 
For simplicity, we assume, in relation to this analysis, that the activity of the agency is 
three-fold: First it must detect infringements and evidence, second, it must prosecute cases, 
                                                 
C)
  
This implies that the objective function: 
 (4)  
Is subject to 
(5)  
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and third it must do other tasks. To be able to exercise any enforcement at all, the agency 
must complete at least two activities: Both detecting a case, and follow it up until at least 
some damage is remedied. It is therefore necessary for the enforcement agency to at least 
balance its distribution of resources between these two activities.  
 
Since the enforcement agency cannot choose which cases to detect
155
, the choice of 
whether to apply a sanction and which sanction to apply is the most important way for the 
enforcement agency to distribute its resources between detecting and following up cases. In 
the situation in which the case is detected, the enforcement agency must decide whether to 
decide on a fully adversarial disposal of the case, procedural settlement, to make a 
commitment binding, or simply drop the case. The situation in which the agency must 
decide what type of decision to impose is therefore particularly important in relation to 
maximizing the reduction in the objective function. 
 
To look closer upon which cases the agency should choose to prosecute, we can see how 
the distribution of resources to different tasks relates to the overall deterrence, i.e. the total 
reduction of loss, which is the reduction in the value of the objective function.
D
 
                                                 
155
 This would require it to know all cases beforehand, and make detection obsolete. 
D)
  
Formally, the marginal effect of deterrence can be found by maximizing the effect of 
deterrence within the budget constraint. In this case, the reduction in the objective function  
 
(4) 
 
 
Is denoted E for enforcement. This reduction, E, can be described, as a function of 
distributing resources to detection, D, prosecution, P, and other acts, O. This gives us the 
effect of enforcement as: 
Footnote continues on next page → 
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(6)   
 
The “cost” of distributing resources to each of these activities is the same, because we 
assume the use of the agency’s resources to cost the same. Thus, we can say that: 
 
(7)  . 
 
C is given. And given that the ”average price” per ”unit” of resources used is the same, and 
the derivative of a constant is 0, we can, for theoretical purposes, simplify the constraint 
equation: 
 
(8)   
 
Combined, this gives us the following langrangian function: 
 
(9)  - – -  
 
Since we maximize L (the lagrangian function) as we would maximize any other function, the 
partial derivative of L, with regard to each of the variables equals the marginal benefit from 
using additional resources on the activity. In other words, we maximize the lagrangian 
function so no additional benefit can be gained by using more resources on one variable. 
This gives us the following set of equations: 
 
(10)                         
 
The partial derivatives here give the marginal gain of increasing  respectively, within 
the budget constraint. When all of these are zero, no additional gain can be brought forth by 
substituting an increase in one variable for another. 
Footnote continues on next page → 
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6.3.1 Opportunity cost 
A central part in procedural economy is getting the highest return, in form of deterrence, 
from the resources spent. In economic terminology opportunity cost implies a choice 
between different, but mutually exclusive results
156
. When choosing one alternative, the 
player forgoes the other. The gain the player could have achieved in choosing the other 
alternative is the opportunity cost. A rational player seeks to maximize own gain, and will 
therefore choose to spend its resources in the way that yields the highest gain
157
. In relation 
to this thesis, and remembering the constraint that the cost level gives on the level of 
activity, the choice of decision and proceeding system is implies an opportunity cost in 
forgoing the other alternatives. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
In a situation where 
 
(11)  
 
The distribution could be in right proportion, but the agency would either not use all of its 
resources, or use too much resources. In fact,  is the “opportunity cost” of the budget 
constraint itself.  is the change in total effect following an increase in the budget. 
 
In the situation where  ,  or  > 0, one could gain a bigger total output by substituting 
the variables with highest gain per additional unit of resources used for other variables with 
lower gain. 
 
 
156
 Buchanan (1987). 
157
 Polinsky and Shavell (1999). 
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If the agency for some reason should choose an alternative that yields a different alternative 
cost to the resources used, the difference between this hypothetical best choice and the 
actual choice will represent a gain or loss respectively to the enforcement agency. 
6.3.2 The marginal effects of choosing the type of decision 
To be able to compare these effects, we must assess the marginal effect of the agency’s 
choice. 
 
The choice of type of decision corresponds to a “total gain” from prosecuting the case and 
a change in resources used on prosecution. 
 
 The gross effect is the remedial effect on the infringement in reducing the overall 
damage caused by competition infringements. Minus the cost of punishment for the 
undertaking, it represents the net effect of the infringement.  
 
 The net effect divided by the amount of resources used will be the “marginal effect 
of deterrence” from the actual caseE.  
 
. 
 
                                                 
E) 
 Basically, this is the same as  
 
(12)  
 
Because it is the change in total output, in relation to the change in resources used for prosecution. 
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The different types of decisions, such as a full adversarial process, commitment decisions 
etc.  all results in different “marginal gains”. If there are no special circumstances in the 
case, a rational agency will thereby choose the alternative yielding the highest marginal 
gain. 
 
6.3.3 Implications of the model 
Every time the agency chooses an alternative that affects the distribution of resources, it 
must assess the “opportunity cost” of using the resources elsewhere. The different 
alternatives with regard to the case yield different “marginal returns”. 
 
The three alternative forms of decisions give different marginal gains: 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that all of these alternatives imply spending more resources in prosecution, i.e. 
increase P.  
 
The output for all of these alternatives will be given by the marginal gain, which is relative. 
However, in absolute terms, more resources are being spent on prosecution in the case of a 
fully adversarial process, than in the case of commitment decisions or settlements
F
. 
 
 
In the case of  
                                                 
F)
  
In this case, marginal gain will be given by  , but typically  >  or , 
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The resources would be spent “other activities” or “detection”, i.e. increases in D, O, or 
both.
G
 It could also be used on future prosecution
158
. 
 
Given a situation where the enforcement agency is able to assess the marginal return on the 
different alternatives, it will choose the highest marginal return.  
 
Given an allocation that is not ideal, this simply means that the opportunity cost of 
continuing a similar distribution will involve a loss for the agency. 
 
6.3.3.1 Typical situations 
In order to analyze more in detail the decisions taken by the enforcement agency, it is 
useful to distinguish between different types of situations. 
6.3.3.1.1 Majority of resources used on prosecution 
In a situation where much of the agency’s resources are tied up in prosecution, marginal 
gains of distributing further resources to prosecution will be low. This is because the 
“opportunity cost” of not using resources on detection of cases and evidence will be quite 
high, as we suppose high marginal returns when little resources are being used on one 
variable, because marginal returns are diminishing. 
                                                 
G)
  
 
I.e.  and/or   > 0. 
 
158
 Though an analysis of whether the agency should save its resources for future use falls outside the scope 
of this thesis. 
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This does not, however, imply that the agency should not use its resources on prosecution. 
It merely states that for the agency to rationally choose to use even more resources on 
prosecution, the marginal gains must exceed those expected from using the resources on 
detection. This can be likened to a demand for “return on investment” that must be 
satisfied. If the agency did choose an option yielding a lower return, this will not maximize 
production of enforcement. 
 
Because of the high opportunity cost by not using resources on detection (i.e. “Other”), 
typically, though not always, the preference in such cases will be for dropping the case, or 
using less resource intensive decisions and proceedings
H
: 
 
Because using resources on other activities than prosecution typically would yield the 
highest effect. Choosing alternatives that do not draw as much resources towards further 
prosecution (i.e. settlements) will typically result in a higher gain than a full procedure. 
 
6.3.3.1.2 Majority of resources used on detection 
Conversely, in a situation where a majority of the agency’s resources are already being 
used on detection, marginal gains of distributing further resources to detection will be low, 
because they add relatively little extra effect. Higher marginal gains are more likely by 
distributing resources towards more extensive investigation of the cases. This may be 
because of the detrimental effect on prevention by choosing an alternative implying less 
severe punishment (settlements), or because there are being imposed actually working 
decisions in too few cases overall. 
 
                                                 
H) Because  
(13)  
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Typically, the order of preference in such cases would be for fully adversarial processes, 
ensuring better effect of prevention and possibly better remedies
I
: 
 
6.3.4 The timeframe of the analysis 
Microeconomic analyses are subject to more or less explicit timeframes. When we compare 
marginal effects, for instance, we extend our analysis to at least two situations (though they 
may be hypothetical). Above, I have used microeconomic “production” models to look 
closer upon the effect of resource distribution. 
 
In relation to the timeframe of the analysis, one could look upon the enforcement agency as 
a producer or a “factory”. When the factory realizes that the current distribution is not ideal 
for maximizing production, it uses every possibility to improve the distribution (as above, 
by assessing the opportunity cost). But in enforcement, different from a factory, cases are 
individual, and cannot reliably be predicted in advance (like for example the production of 
a car). 
 
This is equivalent to a producer, where the order of the marginal returns are random, such 
that prosecuting the first case may yield low marginal returns, the next a very big, then 
small, then big, then big, then small etc: 
 
Figure 6.  
 
                                                 
I) Because 
(14)  
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One may assume that over time, the agency is able to foresee which cases are easiest, and 
then select those first, i.e. order the random “marginal returns” in preference. It is therefore 
usual, even in analyses of enforcement, to assume diminishing marginal value of 
distributing more resources to enforcement, implicitly implying that the agency can choose 
to prosecute the easiest cases first.  
 
In most microeconomic analyses, philosophical questions relating to our knowledge of the 
future are usually answered implicitly. We do, for example, assume that the factory will be 
able to produce a certain output, given certain inputs. In the case of enforcement, there is 
no guarantee for the situation to stay alike. But absent of specific facts of imminent 
changes, historical data are the best guideline we have.  
 
A rational enforcement agency investigates the cases easiest to prosecute first in the long 
term, leading to a more efficient use of resources at first, and diminishing returns. This 
gives the following depiction of marginal effect (y-axis) and resources used (x-axis): 
Figure 7. 
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And total effect as: 
 
Figure 8. 
 
 
 
7 The elements of the decision’s total effect on deterrence 
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7.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, it was described how the effects of enforcement could and should be 
maximized in relation to resource use
J
. The marginal gain of making a decision in a case 
was demonstrated to be the same as the reduction of the objective function, cfr.6.2 and 
6.3.2 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the different elements in the reduction of the objective 
function. 
 
7.2 The effects of imposing a decision 
The effect of imposing a decision, and thus implicitly distributing resources to prosecution, 
has several elements: 
  
First, the effect comes from enforcing the rules in the specific cases and impose remedies 
to end the infringements and restore competition
159
. The more optimally the agency 
distributes its resources, the more infringements is the agency able to remedy, thereby 
                                                 
J)  
I.e. that the enforcement effect, E,  
 
(6)   
 
is the same as a reduction in the overall objective function 
 
(4)  
which the agency seeks to minimize. 
 
159
 See for example Reg. 1/2003 recital 11. 
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decreasing damage to society, either by 1) increasing the number of decisions leading to an 
effective decision
160
, or 2) increasing the effectiveness of the decision in each proceeding, 
and thus the overall enforcement effect. This confers to a reduction in damage ( D(O) ), the 
first element of the objective function. 
 
Second, it comes from the punishment cost
161
 of the remedy. In this analysis, this do is not 
the cost for the agency in prosecuting the case
162
, but for the undertakings in question and 
third parties, because of the decision. The social loss due to the punishment may decrease 
overall social welfare, and is a negative effect in relation to the reduction of the objective 
function, which nonetheless must be taken into account. This confers to an increase in 
punishment cost( S(O) ), the second element of the objective function. 
 
Third, the agency’s policy for handling cases will affect the total effect of prevention163. 
This implies that the ex ante payoff of an infringement for the undertaking will change. 
This will in turn influence the overall level of infringements and thereby overall damage 
inflicted
164
. This thereby confers to a reduction in damage and possibly also punishment 
cost, if less infringers need to be punished. 
 
Fourth, the effect comes from clarifying the law
165
. If the law is clarified, this will likely 
reduce the overall damage inflicted as well as the punishment cost, because the limits of 
what constitutes an infringements becomes clearer for the parties concerned, and it will be 
easier to know when the limits of infringements are overstepped. In addition it will reduce 
the resources used to prosecute cases, both for the agency, the undertakings in question and 
potential infringers. Also with regard to transaction costs, clarification of the law has a 
                                                 
160
 If, for example,  the agency’s resources are so constrained that they cannot prosecute all the cases they 
want. 
161
 Becker (1968). 
162
 Since its grant is decided by the government, the “cost” of prosecuting a case for the agency is only the use 
of its limited resources. 
163
 Wils (2006) b, p 7. 
164
 And punishment cost, because there is no need to punish those who voluntarily refrains from infringing 
165
 Wils (2006) b, p 7. 
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positive impact, because the property rights regarding the undertaking becomes more well-
defined. This reduces the damage and the punishment cost, because it provides the 
stakeholders with greater legal certainty, and f.ex. less negligent breaches of competition 
law occur. 
 
The introduction of the new procedures may correspond to a higher enforcement gain
K
. In 
such a case, the agency is able to achieve a higher enforcement effect using equal or less 
resources, for example by imposing more efficient remedies. 
 
But gain is not the only effect a choice between different kinds of decision can have. Also, 
the “cost” of each case may be less, this means that the agency uses less resources on 
achieving at least the same result as before
L
. 
 
Unlike many maximization problems, both gain and “cost” may therefore be affected by 
the choice of decision. This makes the analysis more complex than many other 
microeconomic analyses.  
 
In total we therefore have the marginal gain of prosecuting the case as: 
 
 
MG =  
                                                 
K)
  
This is , while  
 
L)
  
This is  while  
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7.3 The further analysis 
Since the marginal effect of deterrence is the guideline of the agency in relation to what 
type of decision it chooses, the enforcement agency needs a way to assess this effect. The 
enforcement agency usually relies little on purely mathematical considerations in deterring 
crime in the actual case. I will therefore elaborate more on how the various forms of 
decisions relate to the “marginal gain” of the different elements of the total effect. 
 
This implies a more practical approach, and I will illustrate how the law and sources of law 
relate to the economic considerations regarding choice of type of decision. To do this, I will 
look more closely upon the different elements of the marginal gain. 
 
Economic considerations are paramount in all competition cases, and economic 
argumentation is used, more or less implicitly in many cases. Choosing the appropriate 
remedy, for instance, is mainly an economic consideration, but at the same time a legal 
requirement.  
 
Also reducing the punishment cost is an economic consideration, as well as a legal 
requirement in accordance with the principle of proportionality, ensuring that the remedy 
(including fines) must be necessary to attain the agency’s goals. 
 
In assessing the elements of the marginal effect of prosecuting a case, one can therefore use 
previous case law to demonstrate how the agency could and should use economic 
considerations in their decisions. I will demonstrate how the law interacts with economic 
considerations, and how these considerations, with the general model in mind, can 
contribute to more efficient enforcement. 
 
This is not an economic analysis in a strict sense, rather a demonstration of the resonance 
economic reasoning have in current case law, and an attempt to clarify and systematize 
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how these legal considerations may interact with overall economic considerations and 
theory. 
 
Some effects are, however, not explicitly present in the legal argumentation, this relates 
specifically to the prevention effect and the clarification of the law. While important, these 
are often considered matters of general policy. To address these as elements of the marginal 
gain in each proceeding, I therefore use economic theory, to demonstrate how also these 
effects relate to the marginal gain, and therefore should be assessed in relation to choosing 
a type of decision in the specific case. 
8 A closer assessment of the effects on enforcement in each case 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will look closer upon the different effects on enforcement in each case. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, these effects are : 
- The damage remedied  
- Punishment cost  
- Prevention effect change  
- Clarification of the law  
 
8.2 Damage remedied 
For each new case, the enforcement agency has to evaluate the estimated effects of the 
remedy on direct enforcement, leading to an “expected loss reduction” from the 
competition infringement.  
 
The expected reduction of loss has three main elements: 
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 First, the appropriateness of the remedy in itself, i.e. to which extent the remedy 
has the ability to address the infringement in question. If the proposed remedy is not 
suited to repair the damage, it will not contribute to the overall reduction of 
damage. 
 
 Second, it must address the damage in as short time as possible. Since damage 
incurred by the competition infringement is not a one-time cost, but rather a 
condition in the market. Each unit of time that the infringement is present in the 
market confers to a loss incurred. 
 
 Third, since the remedy is not yet implemented when the Commission makes its 
decision, the agency must take the implementation risk into account. If the remedy 
cannot be imposed, for example, the value of the remedy is greatly diminished. 
 
These three elements will be assessed below: 
 
8.2.1 The appropriateness of the remedy 
8.2.1.1 The legal requirement of finding an appropriate remedy 
Finding the appropriate remedy to end, and, more important to avoid infringements is an 
essential part of the enforcement agency ending an infringement. For the Competition 
enforcer, the remedy must be appropriate in regard to restoring the harmful effects of the 
infringement. In some cases this implies a punishment for the infringer (in form of fines).  
 
The legal condition of proportionality, especially related to the appropriateness of the 
remedy, is closely related to the economic assessment of finding an effective remedy. 
 From a legal viewpoint, the undertakings should have a large degree of freedom relating to 
how to how to end the infringement, and more specific orders should only be given from 
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the enforcement agency if this is needed
166
. As indicated in the section about the relevant 
rules, the principles of legality and proportionality limits the enforcement agency from 
using whatever remedy it wants in order to maximize the effect of deterrence. 
 
Once the damage is determined, the enforcement agency needs to remedy the damage by 
seeking the remedy that over time, if implemented correctly, reduces the loss the most. 
Indeed, using an “appropriate” remedy is legally required in the assessment of 
proportionality after all the procedural alternatives, in accordance with the general principle 
of proportionality (TEU art. 5), and art. 7 explicitly refer to it. The relevant sources of law 
also use the term “appropriate” in the assessment on whether a remedy is proportionate or 
not. 
 
The remedies may vary with regard to the different type of decisions after art. 7, 9, 10 and 
10 a respectively. All of these form a wide legal basis for imposing a wide range of 
remedies. The main difference with regard to the appropriateness of the remedy is perhaps 
that fines can only be imposed in art. 7 decisions, which makes art. 7 remedies the only 
appropriate if the enforcement agency considers it important to impose a fine. 
 
The Commissions legal competence with basis in art. 9 is not fully determined. As 
mentioned above, the pending Alrosa judgment will be particularly influential in 
determining whether art. 9 decisions may go further than what the Commission could 
impose with legal basis in art. 7, as long as the undertaking willingly has committed to it.  
 
In line with the opinion of AG Kokott in the ECJ appeal case, proportionality must be 
assumed in relation to the undertaking offering the commitment
167
. In economic terms, this 
is a very interesting development, because the choice of different types of remedies 
becomes more important to the choice of decision. The type of decision thus influences the 
                                                 
166
 Cfr. Chapter 4. 
167
 Advocate General’s Opinion - 17 September 2009, Commission v Alrosa, Case C-441/07 P, Advocate 
General: Kokott, para 58. 
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marginal return more greatly than it would do if the nature and extent of the remedies that 
could be imposed after art.  7 and 9 were the same. The scope and extent of art. 9 remedies 
are widened. The choice between procedural economy, implementation and appropriate 
remedies are thus more acutely brought to attention. If the Commission’s competence 
under art. 9 is widened, the Commission can to a larger degree choose to trade off other 
effects in return for an effective remedy. 
 
However, if the limit of proportionality is the same under both art. 7 and art.9, as the 
General Court held, the choice is in reality limited to choosing one of the alternatives the 
Commissions could in any case unilaterally given the force of decision. The only reason 
for choosing commitments would thus be speeding up the procedure (i.e. the undertaking 
practically renounces the right to appeal), and ensuring more efficient implementation, not 
the nature or extent of the remedy itself. 
 
8.2.1.2 The economic gain of an appropriate remedy 
From an economic viewpoint, the effectiveness of the remedy is the most important factor 
determining the appropriate remedy. The Commission has a wide economic margin of 
discretion regarding this matter
168
, which, in relation to the assessment of remedy, relates to 
finding the remedy that best addresses the infringement. The enforcement agency should 
also consider future effects.  
 
In a classic competition setting, with regard primarily to static efficiencies, this would be 
equal to seeking to re-introduce free market conditions on the given relevant market, in 
order to maximize total welfare. With regard to dynamic efficiencies, this is equal to 
facilitate the dynamic efficiencies that yield the most value for society. 
 
                                                 
168
 Case T-170/06 Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission of the European Communities para 96. 
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8.2.1.3 Increasing the gain of the remedy 
The alternatives are measured against each other, and the Commission should seek the best 
alternative, should there be several appropriate remedies available. 
 
8.2.1.4 Typical cases for regarding legal and economic appropriateness 
There are two categories of “typical cases”: Those where art. 7 and art. 9 respectively are 
best suited in relation to finding the most appropriate remedy (art. 10a is similar to art. 7 
with regard to the appropriateness of the remedy). On one hand one has clear-cut 
infringements, typically cartel cases, with more or less explicit agreements leading to 
prizing towards the level of a monopolist. And on the other hand, one has “forward-
looking” cases, where the future effects of the infringement are more concerning than past 
actions. 
 
8.2.1.4.1 Typical cases where art. 7 is more appropriate 
The process in art. 7 cases is backwards-looking, almost resembling a trial. From the 
Commission’s side it is focused on finding evidence and stopping and fining the offenders.  
 
In these situations, article 7 gives the commission the competence to impose a decision 
including both an order to stop the infringement, as well as punishment for the act. Indeed 
it may be the only legal basis applicable for imposing the remedy/punishment the 
commission wants, as art. 9 do not form the basis for imposing a penalty. 
 
A typical example of such a case is the “Car glass cartel case”169 , where the Commission 
imposed a fine of almost 1.4 Billion Euro
170
, the biggest at that time. In this case, the 
remedy was just as much aimed at past actions than at achieving a better market in the 
future. The investigation was initiated by the Commission, after an anonymous tip, and 
                                                 
169 Car glass cartel case IP/08/1685. 
170 The total fine of the entire cartel. 
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after conducting surprise inspections to gather evidence the Commission imposed the fine. 
In this case, a settlement was not an option because a fine as a central part of the decision. 
 
Other typical cases were art. 7 decisions are more appropriate is the cases where the 
undertakings prove uncooperative, do not acknowledge an infringement, or when 
Commission wants to impose a different remedy than the undertaking offers to commit to. 
8.2.1.4.2 Typical cases where art. 9 is more appropriate 
Different situations arise where the infringement already committed is minor or hard to 
accurately verify, but the conduct of the firm and the market situation raises concerns for 
the competition in the future. In this situation, the Commission focuses on preventing 
future loss, rather than restoring the infringement.  
 
A typical example of such a case was the RWE gas market case
171
. In this case, the 
Commission opened investigations on RWE, on basis of its conduct as a market leader on 
the German gas market. It found preliminary that RWE infringed the EU treaty rules on the 
abuse of dominant market position after art. 102. The abuse in particular consisted of 
systematically seeking to squeeze out competitors, and squeezing their margins. However, 
these types of infringements tends to be harder to prove for the enforcement agency, 
because the line between being a dominant firm, which is legal, and abusing its powers, 
which constitutes an infringement, is harder to establish. 
 
While these actions were committed in the past, and infringements of art.102 could 
theoretically imply a fine, the Commission accepted the commitments from RWE to divest 
its control of the German gas transmission network.  This remedy did specifically address 
the past action infringement as no infringement was officially found, but ensured a better 
market in the future. Specifically, the remedy addressed one of the aims behind art. 102, 
namely to prohibit firms to abuse their dominant positions. It was therefore chosen as 
appropriate in relation to the possible infringement.  With regard to the criteria of 
                                                 
171
 RWE Gas Foreclosure OJ C 310, 05.12.2008. 
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appropriateness, it is also interesting to note that the case was settled using structural 
remedies (in this case divestiture).  
 
It also shows the wide discretion of the agency with regard to selecting a remedy on basis 
of general considerations for future competition rather than specifically addressing an 
infringement. 
 
8.2.1.4.3 Cases where the appropriateness is more uncertain 
In-between the typical cases, there may arise cases where both the past and the future 
market situation has to be assessed. In such a situation, the Commission may have to bear 
in mind a possible trade-off between different effects of the decision. 
 
An example of the difficulties the enforcer has in deciding upon the optimal remedy is the 
Microsoft case
172
. In this case, the Commission i.a. decided, in an art. 7 decision, that 
Microsoft, to address the tying of its media player with it computer operating system, 
Windows, should offer a version of Windows without Windows Media Player. A fine of € 
497 million was also an important part of the decision, which made the use of commitment 
decisions inapplicable. The impact of this remedy was minimal, however, because 
suppliers of personal computers still chose to provide the version with the media player, not 
the one without. 
 
In contrast, with regard to the Commission’s allegations of Microsoft tying its browser 
software to its operating system, Microsoft has recently offered commitments
173
 to make a 
“choice screen”, offering a choice of 12 of the most widely used browsers, on all of its 
versions of Windows, including existing versions, through updates, and it will thus reach 
out to 100 million computers in Europe and 30 million new users per year
174
. This remedy, 
                                                 
172
 Case T-201/04. Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities. 
173
 In accordance with art. 9, reg. 1/2003. 
174
 Commission MEMO/09/558,16/12/2009. 
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though not implemented yet, will probably have a substantially higher impact than the 
remedy concerning the media player, which in practice had little impact. 
 
The case effectively demonstrates that the more expensive types of decision in terms of 
resource use (i.e. art. 7 decisions) do not necessarily yield better results than decisions with 
negotiated remedies. 
 
An even better example may be the Norwegian GFU
175
 (Gas Negotiation Committee) 
agreement. In this case, the Commission expressed concern over gas produced on the 
Norwegian continental shelf being sold exclusively through a committee, and that given 
this exclusivity this constituted a cartel. 
 
The producers offered commitments to stop the joint marketing and selling of gas to 
address the question of a cartel. Even more interesting, the two biggest producers, then 
Statoil and Hydro, offered to offer certain volumes to new customers, an obligation the 
Commission could likely not impose. The producers also confirmed that they would not 
impose territorial restrictions or use restrictions on their gas sales agreements. 
 
In this case, the competition agency found the remedy appropriate because it would mend 
their concerns about competition, even though it did not imply a punishment of the 
previous infringement directly. In this case, the very clear and exclusive nature of the 
committee would, if the case had not been settled, likely made the case appropriate for a 
fine. Thus, at least theoretically, it is a kind of settlement the Commission could now no 
longer agree to after art. 9, which specifically indicates commitment decisions are not 
appropriate for cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine. 
 
The case is an interesting example, not only because it shows that settlements can yield 
remedies that address other situations than only those about which the agency has 
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expressed concern (in this case opening up for new customers, not only disbanding the 
cartel). It also demonstrates how the Commission weighs the overall outcome of the 
different types of decisions against each others, and has a pragmatic approach to trading off 
higher fines for more extensive remedies. 
 
Generally, this broadens the scope of situations where art. 9 is applicable, as commitments 
are more appropriate for facilitating better market conditions in the future, than addressing 
clear-cut competition infringements. 
 
The case was concluded before the new regulations (1/2003) had entered in force, but can 
nonetheless be illustrative with regard to the agency’s discretionary competence to consider 
remedies appropriate. 
 
 
8.2.2 The time used to implement the remedy 
8.2.2.1 Legal practice: Examples on differences in implementation time 
Three cases can serve as an illustration of the vast time used to implement decisions in EU 
competition cases, when a full procedure is used
176
, and the considerably shorter time-span 
of settled cases
177
. 
 
The Irish Ice Cream case
178
 arose from an attempt from the producer of chocolate ice cream 
Mars to gain access to its products in Unilever freezer cabinets in 1989. Unilever won the 
domestic case in Ireland, but Mars appealed to the Commission,. In 1998, the Commission 
imposed a decision finding that Unilever’s practice of denying Mars access to its freezers 
constituted an infringement of art. 101 and 102. Unilever contested this, and gained an 
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order for staying the execution while the case was pending. The order to terminate the 
infringement thus became effective in 2003, after the General Court rejected the application 
for annulment. 
 
Similarly, in the PVC cartel case, the investigation started in 1983, the Commission found 
that there was an infringement. Many of the PVC producers contested the decision, and 
brought it in first for the General Court, then ECJ, which rejected the Commission’s 
decision, because it did not follow the Commission’s Rule of Procedure.  The Commission 
made a second decision, which eventually was confirmed by ECJ in October 2002. 
 
Commitment decisions, on the other hand, have proved to be very effective with regard to 
time. A prime example of the application of the new rules is the Cannes Agreement 
decision
179
, which was the first case to be conducted under the new rules alone
180
. The 
Initiation of the proceedings was in January 2006, and the case was able to adopt a final 
decision in October 2006, which is significantly shorter than the usual procedure. 
 
8.2.2.2 The economic cost of late implementation 
Time is an important factor in remedying the loss. The practical effect of a perfectly 
appropriate remedy is smaller the later it is implemented. Prolonged procedures have been 
a major problem in European competition enforcement, and are reasons alternatives to the 
full adversarial process was introduced
181
.  
 
Late implementation of sufficient remedies is not only a problem related to fairness and 
justice, but also directly related to avoiding losses of social welfare caused by competition 
infringements. 
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As discussed under 5.6.2, competition infringements are deviations from the natural 
conditions of the market. The continuously incurred damage to consumer and the society in 
general is therefore approximately proportional with the time in which the infringement is 
present.  
 
In case of the PVC cartel case
182
, the companies could therefore, theoretically, continued 
their infringements (while at a considerably higher risk, because the infringement was 
detected) for many years, several of them only because the Commission did not follow the 
procedural rules. 
 
Aside from increased damage, the future effects of not remedying an infringement in time 
may result in even more detrimental effects on a market. If a dominant undertaking misuses 
its market power after art. 102, it may force a smaller competitor off the market altogether, 
and in turn use its market power raise prices towards the level of a monopolist. This could 
very well have been the case in the Unilever case, as Unilever
183
 de facto was able to hold 
its competitor off the market for the over a decade. In the meantime, the competitor may 
find the barriers of entry so high it abandons the entry on the market altogether. 
 
With regard to dynamic efficiency, distortions of natural market conditions may alter the 
development leading to long term losses. Also here, one can assume a correlation between 
the time of the infringement and the impact of the infringement. This factor will therefore, 
in a procedural setting, often be one of the most decisive factors in determining the 
effectiveness of one remedy compared to another. 
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8.2.3 Implementation risk of the decision 
8.2.3.1 Legal practice: An example on implementation risk 
Remedying a welfare loss caused by a competition infringement is not only dependent on 
the enforcement agency’s success in measuring the damage, procuring the appropriate 
remedy, and using minimal time on the proceedings, but also on its effective actual 
implementation.  
 
The Microsoft
184
 case is one example of this. In this case the decision of March 24, 2004, 
ordered Microsoft i.a. to disclose interface information to its competitors, in order to allow 
competitors to interoperate with Windows. However, following late implementation, the 
Commission initiated compliance proceedings in 2005, and found in February 2008 that 
Microsoft had not complied with its obligations until October 2007, more than three years 
after the decision, and almost three years after the General Court upheld the decision. 
Especially in areas of business that are dynamic in nature, such as software development, a 
period of three years may include considerable development in the relevant market. 
 
8.2.3.2 The economic importance of considering the implementation risk 
From an economic viewpoint the enforcement agency should try to maximize the 
enforcement effect by choosing the alternative for implementation that yields the highest 
expected gain. The enforcement agency therefore has to assess the probability for success 
in implementing the remedy. 
 
If the undertaking do not contest the decision made by the enforcement agency, 
implementation agreed upon, and there is no need for the enforcement agency to dwell 
further on alternative ways of ending the case. If the undertaking, as it often does, contests 
the decision, the question of the optimal way of implementing decision arises. 
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A settlement that is not optimal may for example yield better results in the long run than 
the alternative, if the implementation risk and procedural economy outweighs the gain one 
would expect from pursuing a case the agency would likely lose.  
 
It is not an aim for the agency in itself to “win” cases, and the agency should take all 
reasonable measures to prevent false findings of infringements. But there might be 
situations where the infringement very likely has been committed, but the evidence is 
concealed, illegally gained etc.  so the agency is unable to use it in court. The PVC cartel 
case dragged out several years because the commission had violated a procedural rule
185
. In 
such situations, where the agency might have a good case, but is unable to implement its 
preferred decision for some reason, the implementation risk should be properly taken into 
account. 
8.2.3.3 Implementation risks with regard to a full adversarial process 
In a fully adversarial procedure, only winning the case will ensure proper implementation 
of the remedy (given that the infringer complies in the implementation, which it usually 
does due to threat of further sanctions etc.). If the enforcement agency looses the case, the 
remedy will not be implemented. In this situation the lost case may be an indicator that 
there has been no infringement at all, in which case the enforcement agency should drop 
the case. Or it may be that the enforcement agency was not able to effectively demonstrate 
the infringement for the court. In such a case the enforcement agency should consider 
settlements. 
 
Court decisions rely on a number of different factors, such as the composition of the court, 
the legal knowledge of the parties, personal preferences etc. However, the agency should 
be able to estimate the chances of winning the case. For example, the amount of evidence 
possessed by the enforcement agency would be an indicator as to the success of the 
enforcement agency in winning the case, and thus implementing the remedy. 
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8.2.3.4 Implementation risks with regard to settlements 
Settlements, if accepted by the undertaking, provides a much more certain way of 
achieving the enforcement effect. But given rational players, it is little likely that the 
undertaking will accept a sanction through settlement that do not imply a reduction in the 
expected penalty. It is therefore a danger that the effect of the settlement could therefore be 
lower either because of less impact on repairing the damage, or because of the lesser 
prevention effect186 the sanction would give. 
 
In total, the enforcement agency must choose between implementing the remedy in the 
form it desires (art. 7 provides the widest basis for this), but with less probability of gaining 
sufficient legal basis for the implementation, or with more probability achieve a remedy 
which content is determined by the offering undertaking. 
 
8.3 The cost of punishments and other enforcement acts  
8.3.1 Legal requirements to reduce the punishment cost 
Reducing the cost of punishment and other enforcement acts is both a legal requirement 
(which confers to a constraint in economic terms) as well as an aim for the enforcement 
agency.  
 
Already the legal basis of the Commission’s decision points towards achieving effective 
enforcement without harming the undertakings needlessly
187
. Also the general limits of 
equal treatment of undertakings
188
 limits the Commission from imposing as high sanctions 
it wants in a case. 
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That being said, the Commission has a large certain discretion with regard to the level of 
fine, as demonstrated in Case T-150/89 Martinelli v Commission
189
, where the court stated 
that:  
 
“Fines constitute an instrument of the Commission’s competition policy. That is why it 
must be allowed a margin of discretion when fixing their amount, in order that it may 
channel the conduct of undertakings towards observance of the competition rules.” 
 
In the assessment of proportionality, both in relation to art. 7 and art. 9
190, “necessity” is an 
important element. This implies that the decision must go no further than needed, and if the 
commission can choose between different equally appropriate remedies, it should choose 
the one less onerous to the undertaking.  
 
Since the two major elements in the consideration of proportionality is that the decision is 
“appropriate” and “necessary”, one may  say that appropriate refers primarily to the 
effectiveness, while necessary refers to the “punishment cost”.  This is illustrative of how 
fulfilling the legal requirements, namely reducing the damage and the cost of punishment, 
fit well with the aim of overall effective enforcement.  
 
With regard to fines, the punishment cost is implicitly referred to in the “Guidelines on the 
method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003. In 
(35) it is held that the Commission may take the undertaking’s inability to pay into account 
in a “specific social and economic contest”. This is limited to “exceptional cases”, and it is 
not enough only to state an adverse or loss-making situation. It is a condition that imposing 
fines in accordance with the guidelines would “irretrievable jeopardize the economic 
viability of the undertaking concerned and cause its assets to lose all their value”. The strict 
wording seems to indicate that the Commission does not wish to be approached with such 
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requests on a general basis. The Commission has likely, though, a wide discretion also in 
finding which are the “exceptional cases”. 
 
8.3.2 The economic cost of punishment in competition law 
The cost of punishment is the cost to the offender that is punished, minus the gain of 
others
191
. The agency should take into account the total effect of the punishment. Whether 
it will damage total welfare depends on its alternative use. Remedies, for example in 
settlements, may have positive effects on total welfare, and over time imply a gain for the 
society. There is therefore not entirely sure that a sanction ultimately results in a social 
cost. However, in most cases where a punishment is imposed, at least one party will be 
harmed. 
 
With regard to competition law, most punishments are given in form of fines, which is a 
monetary transaction. The total effect on welfare will therefore depend on whether or not 
the recipient of the money can use them to gain more value than the punished party.  
 
It is not the purpose of the competition enforcer to reduce all social loss incurred by 
infringers of the law. Punishment is society’s reaction towards those that breaks the rules of 
the society and by definition implies a loss of welfare to the infringer. In fact, punishment 
can be defined as “an evil which the state impose on an offender because of the offense, 
with the intention that he should feel it as an evil”192 The “punishment cost” is also the 
price the society must pay in order to create effective prevention.  
 
However, in cases where the effects on social welfare by punishment is extraordinarily 
severe, the enforcement agency may opt for a decision that better reconciles the interests in 
punishing, remedying and at the same time reducing loss of welfare. 
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Almost any kind of sanction, whether intended as punishment or not, can result in a loss of 
social welfare. If the remedies needed to comply with the law imply high implementation 
costs for the undertaking they may de facto imply a punishment cost. Also stakeholders in 
the undertaking, such as shareholders, customers etc. can be affected by the finding of 
infringement. Typically, loss of social welfare can stem from loss of liquidity, lessened 
value creation, increased prices for customers, etc.  
 
The impact of competition decisions on the valuation of firms has been investigated by 
Langus and Motta (2006). Using event study techniques, they show that antitrust actions 
have an impact. Dawn raids lowers the share price by 2%, decisions by 3% and when the 
court upholds, the price is lowered by 1%
193
. 
 
For major corporations, this reduction in market value may often be bigger than the fine, 
and may be representative of how the market price the vast costs of the competition 
procedure, as an equal element as the fine itself in the total cost of a competition 
proceeding. 
 
The type of decision may imply different effects on social welfare. Typically fines and a 
long procedure will imply the highest cost to social welfare, sometimes impairing the 
undertaking, while settlements imply lessened loss of welfare for the undertaking.  
 
8.3.3 Reducing the economic cost of punishments 
The EU competition rules do not explicitly refer to “punishment cost”, but to the overall 
standard of proportionality, and the ability to pay. The question may arise as to how far the 
Commission must go in order to reduce the punishment cost. It seems clear from the 
sources of law that the Commission is obliged to choose the less insidious of two 
alternatives, but it is not required to conduct extensive investigations to assess this. AG 
Kokott, in the her Opinion in the Alrosa case, indeed says that the Commission “need not 
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take into consideration alternatives whose appropriateness could not be established without 
such efforts”194 
 
Drawing on previous experience, the Commission could get an overview of what different 
sanctions tends to imply of costs for the undertakings, and society in general. Various 
forms of “market tests” and close interaction between the infringer and the enforcement 
agency can also help avoid the most severe effects of punishment. 
 
To a certain extent, also the interest of third parties must be taken into account. This is the 
case in the important pending Alrosa case. Alrosa contests the commitment made by De 
Beers, amongst others on the grounds that it goes further than what was necessary to 
remedy the damage (i.e. the decision was disproportionate), and thus harmed Alrosa more 
than was necessary to restore competition. 
 
8.4 The choice of sanction’s effect on prevention 
8.4.1 The importance of effective prevention 
Prevention is an important aim is almost any law enforcement. It denotes the optimal way 
of avoiding crime – by deterring it before it is committed. Prevention is the most effective 
means of stopping infringements. Prevention saves resources needed to detect and 
prosecute the infringements, not to mention the social cost of punishment. 
 
Achieving prevention can be looked upon as a relation between a principal and an agent, 
where the agency is the principal, and the undertakings are the agents
195
. The principal-
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agent relation occurs when a principal seeks to make the agent act in the interest of the 
principal, while both the principal and the agent seeks to maximize their own gain
196
.  
 
One of the central issues in principal-agency theory is how to align the interest of the agent 
to that of the principal. The study of principal-agent relations often relates to the choice of 
the optimal incentive structure to realize this aim. 
 
Prevention a way the enforcement agency can influence the actions of the potential 
infringer, and create an incentive to reduce infringements.  The actions of the undertaking 
are influenced by the type of decision, because the type of decision will affect both the 
expected probability for being caught as well as the expected penalty. 
 
8.4.2 The basic model for the undertakings behavior 
According to established theory, the undertaking will commit an act only if the expected 
gain from doing so exceeds the expected loss197. A participant in the market has a limitless 
set of potential actions, some of which also represent infringement of various rules, 
amongst them competition rules.  
 
For a rational, risk neutral undertaking effective prevention through expected loss by 
committing the crime is the only factor restraining the undertaking from infringing the 
competition rules
198
. The firm will therefore commit an infringement of law if its expected 
gain is bigger than the expected punishment if caught. 
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The expected punishment has two elements, both the probability of being punished, and the 
severity of the punishment imposed if caught
199M
.  
8.4.2.1 The probability of being punished 
To achieve effective prevention, there must be a realistic probability for the undertaking to 
actually incur a loss if it chooses to infringe. Pure prevention can probably not deter all 
infringements, if the undertakings are rational. In a situation all undertakings refrains from 
infringing because of a high perceived probability of being caught, it is likely that an 
undertaking will start to infringe because it perceives the probability of being caught so low 
that expected gain from the infringement exceeds the expected loss. The effect of 
prevention is therefore dependent on the enforcement agency effectively demonstrating its 
ability to apprehend infringers
200
. 
 
The probability of being punished depends on two factors. First the ability of the EA to 
detect the infringement, and second that the EA is actually able to impose a sanction 
                                                                                                                                                    
limits of law. This method corresponds to what can be referred to as norm-dependent rational behavior 
(Rettsøkonomi (2008) p. 499). 
 
M)
  
 For any undertaking, x, an offense, O, will be committed given that gain, g outweighs the expected 
loss given by the probability, p and the expected loss for the undertaking, l. 
 
(15)   
 
The effect of prevention is given by the right hand side of the equation, as only the expected loss 
prevents a rational offender from committing the crime.  Denotes the expected fine of the 
undertaking if it is caught, and  denotes the probability of being caught and fined
199
. 
 
200
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implying a punishment
N
. The probability for detection and finding sufficient evidence is 
closely related to how the enforcement agency distributes its resources, typically because 
this procures more evidence and increases the probability of the EA to have a legal basis 
for imposing sanctions.  
 
Each finding of infringement has a preventive effect and an overall effect on future cases. 
The probability of detecting an infringement can be expressed as infringements found 
divided by total infringements. If the enforcement agency stops finding new infringements, 
total infringements will typically still rise, meaning that the proportion of detected 
infringements becomes watered out. We can therefore assume diminishing effect with time 
for each case of detected infringements. 
 
This effect will be reinforced by the typical human bias in giving weight to recent events. 
Less active enforcement may also indicate that the enforcement agency currently is less 
able to detect infringements. To uphold the prevention effect there must be some kind of 
continuance in the apprehension of the infringers. These factors make it difficult to 
estimate the impact one single case has on the total perceived probability of being 
punished.  
 
The probability of successful prosecution is also dependent on the prosecutor’s abilities, the 
composition of the court etc. For both the undertaking and the enforcement agency the 
                                                 
N)  
This gives  
(16) 
 
 
Where stands for the probability of detection and successful prosecution 
respectively, where both .  
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system of independent courts implies that the outcome of the specific case is an exogenous 
factor. Implementation risk, as discussed above, therefore relates both to the 
implementation in the specific case, as well as the overall effect of prevention.  
 
8.4.2.2 The severity of the penalty 
Different types of decisions correspond to different levels of penalty, or severity, of the 
sanction. The introduction of settlements in EU law has led to increased polarization 
between the severity of the penalty and the decision types. 
 
With regard to art. 7 decisions, which may involve fines, the level of fines has increased 
the last year, especially in connection with cartel cases
201
 One of the main aims of this 
increase has been to increase overall deterrence. 
 
The newly introduced types of decisions involving settlements, on the other hand, imply a 
less severe sanction; otherwise the undertakings would have no incentive to settle. The 
enforcement agency should therefore be careful in selecting the cases chosen for 
settlements. Only in cases where other factors, such as repairing the damage, or reducing 
social cost outweighs the loss in prevention effect, should settlements be used. 
 
This does not mean that settlements do not have a penalizing effect in the eyes of the 
undertaking. There is no legal basis in EU law for making the undertaking incur a loss 
through settlement; the infringement can only be remedied. However, in line with 
Kokkott's opinion in the Alrosa case
202
, the Commission has a relatively wide discretion 
with regard to which sanction it will impose. Since proportionality is assumed in relation to 
the undertaking that proposes the commitment, the companies have higher incentives to 
make “high bids” of settlement because the expected loss is quite high. While not labeled 
“punishments” explicitly, few undertakings would likely voluntarily part with valuable 
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assets (though for market price), such as in the RWE case. Settlements may therefore also 
be regarded as an “expected penalty” in relation to prevention, though not as high as in a 
decision implying a fine.  
 
8.4.3 The economic effect of prevention in a market 
The effect of prevention is the difference between the size of total damage caused by 
competition infringements
203
 with and without the enforcement agency, ranging from no 
functioning EA and a perfectly functioning EA that prevents all crime
204O
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 Cfr. The objective function. 
O) 
 
If a perfectly functioning EA prevents all crime, this implies that  
 
(17) 
 
 
 
, i.e. the undertakings will not infringe because the loss is expected to be bigger than 
the gain. Typically this will be that the EA detects almost all of the infringements, as a 
high sanction alone is not enough to deter all criminal acts 
 
 
 
In case of a non-functioning agency,  
 
(18)   
 
Footnote continues on next page → 
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In the market regulated by the EA, total loss is given by the aggregate sum of the harm 
caused by the infringements committed by the different undertakings that have chosen to 
infringe.  
 
Since each undertaking’s decision to infringe or not is dependent on the estimated expected 
penalty, the total effect in the market is directly dependent on the probability of being 
caught and the probable punishment if caught for each of the undertakings on the market
P
.  
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
P ) 
If the companies, for simplicity, are assumed to have equal values, i.e. all are x, the 
number of cases where gain theoretically outweigh losses, for n companies, is given 
by 
 
(19) 
 
Resulting in  offenses. Since the undertakings are assumed risk neutral, the 
theoretically possible crimes is equal to the actually committed crimes: 
 
(20)   
 
Total damage of  offences committed, is therefore the aggregate sum the damage 
of each of the infringements, I, ,  : 
(21) 
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Generally, the prevention effect is therefore highest when the product of the probability of 
punishment and the punishment imposed is highest, this gives the least chance that gain 
outweighs loss for the undertaking concerned, consequently fewer offenses committed, and 
minimized total damage. The aim for the EA, with regard to prevention, is therefore to 
maximize this product.  
 
For the enforcement agency, the effect of prevention corresponds to a reduction in overall 
damage. Because of this effect, there is also less punishment cost (there is no need for 
action), as well as less resources used on prosecution. This results in a higher aggregate 
value of the market for the society. 
 
8.4.4 The relation between optimal distribution of resources and the effect of 
prevention 
In relation to the analysis of optimal resource distribution above, we can analyze how 
resource distribution will affect how the agency handles cases. The total effect of 
prevention in relation to each firm will depend on two variables  
 
(23) 
 
 
 We postulate that adding further resources to detection will relatively increase 
probability for detection, . 
 Further, we can postulate that adding further resources to prosecution will relatively 
increase the severity of the sanction, . 
 
Given the cost constraint, as  increases,  will decrease because the agency uses more 
resources on detection and less on prosecution, which necessitates the use of less severe 
sanctions such as settlements (resources for other uses held constant).  
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Conversely,  as adding further resources to prosecution will increase , will decrease 
because the agency now will prefer the alternative that yields the highest sanction (and 
expected penalty), although they consume more resources. 
 
As mentioned above, there will be little prevention effect both without any probability of 
being caught, as well as with little sanction.  are inversely related because their 
value depends on increases in inversely correlated variables. This gives us the following 
relation between distributing resources to  respectively
205
: 
 
Figure 9. 
 
 
 
Generally, this demonstrates that the general effect of prevention need not necessarily be a 
trade-off between efficient distribution and deterrent effect, in fact, to a certain degree; they 
are both dependent on each other. However, the distribution that yields the highest overall 
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prevention may not necessarily yield the highest overall welfare with regard to the 
enforcement agency’s aim. This is dependent also on the other effects of the agency’s 
decision, and is not given generally. 
 
Intuitively one might assume diminished deterrence being a trade-off to be paid when 
choosing to use settlements
206
. My analysis shows that this cannot be answered generally. It 
further shows that, broadly speaking, overall total effect of prevention is dependent on 
optimal distribution. As the distribution approaches the equilibrium, however, there might 
be relatively speaking bigger differences between the distribution giving optimal 
prevention and the distribution optimal enforcement. But the total effect of the trade-off 
between prosecution and detection might not be as big as feared. 
 
8.5 Clarification of the law 
8.5.1 The legal basis 
Clarification of law is seldom used as an argument in specific cases, but is often pointed 
out as an important aspect in the choice of decisions
207
. Clarification of law relates both 
clarifications of the content of specific decisions, for those directly concerned
208
, as well as 
to clarification of the general application of the competition rules.  
 
8.5.2 The economic cost of legal uncertainty 
In economic terms this uncertainty can be classified as an increased transaction cost with 
regard to the companies, or as a process risk for the undertakings.  
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EU competition law is largely modeled on the free-market model, under the presumption 
that this model will ensure efficient use of resources. As demonstrated by economist 
Ronald Coase, transaction costs are hindering effectively trading resources to the entity 
that appreciates them the most
209
. Thus, increased transaction costs decrease social welfare. 
 
General clarification of law eases the understanding of the rules, and makes it easier for 
both the Agency as well as the undertakings to predict whether their actions will be within 
legal limits. With regard to overall social welfare, these uncertainties impose elements of 
risk with regard to transactions and legal actions. The magnitude of sanctions in EU 
competition law makes this an important consideration for anyone considering transactions 
with parties under Commission investigation
210
. Especially buyers of companies have to 
compute this risk into their bids.  
 
In the specific case, legal uncertainties regarding right to appeal etc. may not facilitate the 
optimal level of damage suits following appeals
211
. Further, the more uncertain the law is, 
the more legal disputes will arise because the solution to the disputed problem is not clear. 
Unnecessary suits brought for the courts may for example be damaging to overall social 
welfare. 
8.5.3 Reducing the economic cost of legal uncertainty 
With overall enforcement in mind, the enforcement agency should have this consideration 
for legal clarification in mind when adopting decisions in the specific case. Cases vary with 
regard to their applicability as precedents, and the agency should to a large degree be able 
to estimate the value as a precedent loosely by estimating impact, whether disagreements 
encompasses much used rules and other important factors. 
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The pending Alrosa case is a good example on a case which fundamentally makes the 
regulations regarding commitment decisions much clearer. Regardless of it outcome, it will 
at least ensure more certainty regarding the use of commitment decisions, which will make 
settlement negotiations easier both for the Commission and the undertakings. 
 
The newly introduced art. 10 should also be remarked in relation to the aim of clarification 
of law. This decision has the form of a negative finding of infringement. The provision has 
still not be used, but allows the Commission to “find that [Article 101 and 102, own 
insertion] of the Treaty is not applicable to an agreement, decision by an association of 
undertakings or a concerted practice”, because the acts do not constitute competition 
infringements. The condition is that “public interest” “so requires”, which may well be the 
case in relation to clarification of law. However, the scope of art. 10 is not as wide as its 
wording may indicate, it is confined to “exceptional” cases212. 
9 The resources used to achieve the effects in each case 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will look more closely upon how the achieving effects of enforcement 
require the use of the agency’s resources. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the 
“price” or “cost” of the agency in imposing a decision, and the elements of this cost. 
 
9.2 The relationship between the basis for decision and resource use 
The choice of type of decision directly affects the resource situation of the enforcement 
agency. Different types of decisions usually correspond to different cost elements. The 
economic concept of settlement between rational participants implies that both parties 
benefit from the agreement. Usually the parties are interested in keeping the case costs low.  
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For the enforcement agency, the costs arising from winning a fully adversarial process, 
losing a fully adversarial process as well as a settlement must be estimated. As presupposed 
above, one would intuitively assume the cost of a full procedure to be higher than the cost 
of a settlement
Q
. This is, however, not vital for the analysis as it is the final expected 
marginal gain in each case that should be the agency’s criterion for decision. 
 
9.3 The different elements of resource use 
9.3.1 The “cost” of detecting infringements 
The probability of detection increases with the amount of resources used to conduct 
investigations, or other conduct to detect cases.  
 
If we assume that the most clear-cut infringements are the easiest to find, and that finding 
additional offences harder and harder because some of the infringers use sophisticated 
means of avoiding detection, the probability of detection will decrease with each case 
detected, implying that the marginal return on resources spent on detecting cases is 
diminishing. 
 
The methods of detection may, however, vary, and “technological improvements” such as 
amnesties, leniency etc. may affect the payoff.  
 
9.3.2 “Cost” effects of gathering evidence 
Using its investigative powers, the commission can gain the evidence it needs in many 
cases. But this uses the resources of the agency. First, it is the use of time of the personnel 
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of the agency, time which could otherwise have been spent on detecting, procuring 
evidence, prosecuting or following up other cases. Like any other decision, the decision of 
how much resources should be used to procure evidence is based on different criteria, and 
is typically among the day-to-day decisions the employees will have to make. On a higher 
level, the enforcement agency should seek to gather the optimal amount of evidence.  
 
9.3.3 The “cost” of prosecuting and following up the cases 
Also the cost of prosecuting and following up cases can be expressed as a relation between 
enforcement effect and resource use. If we assume that the enforcement agency prioritizes 
the prosecution of the cases after expected outcome, the marginal returns from prosecuting 
further cases will be diminishing. The enforcement agency should therefore first prosecute 
the cases which it is most secure on winning first, as they pose the least process risk. 
9.3.4 The type of remedy’s impact on “cost” 
Regard should be had to the overall procedure, not only to the case costs. Even in relation 
to this thesis, in which only an overview of the conceptually different types of remedies is 
given, the choice between different remedies has is important in assessing the question of 
cost. 
 
 The difference between structural and behavioral remedies should for example be 
observed. Structural remedies represent a onetime cost, while behavioral remedies in many 
cases has both a more vague effect, and require following up, both of which draws 
resources from the enforcement agency. The agency’s a wide economic margin of 
discretion when imposing the remedy has been highlighted in court practice
213
. 
 
The table below gives a short comparison of the differences in major cost elements and 
thereby the differences in cost situations between structural and behavioral remedies. 
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Table 2: The relation between remedy and elements of cost. 
Remedy Structural Behavioral 
Cost 
elements  
 Implementation  Introduction 
 Following up 
Cost 
situation 
Higher initial costs. Lower 
“enforcement 
/administrative cost”, 
because decision is already 
implemented 
Lower initial cost, higher 
“enforcement 
/administrative cost” 
 
Traditionally, structural remedies have been considered more burdensome on the 
undertakings than behavioral. But this need not always be the case. In fact, while 
behavioral remedies almost always imply some constraint on the undertaking, structural 
remedies (e.g. selling one business division), may, at a sufficient price, be a fair trade for 
the undertaking. Further, the effects of a structural remedy are easier seen than those of a 
behavioral remedy. That being said, few firms would willingly commit to selling one of its 
business units without having a pressing reason to do so
214
. But given a choice between 
remedies, both the agency and undertakings may be better off with a structural remedy. In 
line with the increased concern for the cost-effectiveness of the agency, one might argue 
that a shift from behavioral to structural remedies could address this more effectively. 
10 Examples on cases where one type of decision is better suited  
10.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, situations where one type of decision is better suited than the other 
alternatives are demonstrated. This will typically be because one of the effects above, 
assessed more or less explicitly, predominantly affects the perceived marginal gain, on 
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which the agency bases its decision. The purpose of this chapter is to look closer upon how 
the agency may use the assessment of marginal gain above to choose the optimal decision 
in each case.  
10.2 Practical application of optimal case selection 
Above, the different components in the marginal effect of prosecution (in various forms) in 
relation to resources used were assessed. We have seen the “typical” unideal situations 
where the “opportunity cost” rises because resources are distributed unevenly. 
 
Optimal distribution does not imply even distribution. It might be that the agency is better 
off using a considerably higher percentage of its resources to one variable, there is not a 
precondition in the analysis that the distribution should be even. Intuitively, one would for 
example deem prosecution of the case to crave relatively more resources than detection. It 
is the marginal gain from adding resources to the variable that should be the same. 
 
However, in a single, individual conditions may be influential in determining the marginal 
gain. Each of the factors discussed, may individually have such an impact that it is given 
most weight in the final decision of the agency.  
 
These cases are “typical” or “idealized”  cases. In cases where one or more of these factors 
are dominant, one type of decision will typically stand out as more appropriate. In practice, 
the agency will rely on these expectation rather than detailed assessments of a computed 
marginal gain. The concept is, however, exactly the same as in the analysis above, namely 
gaining an optimal return on investment, though not as explicitly referred to. 
 
The table below gives a summary of situations where the importance of one factor in the 
case makes one type of decision more appropriate. On the left side, is the different factors 
the agency must consider in each case, and examples on situations where this factor may 
carry extra importance. On the right side is the type of decision that is usually better suited 
to address such a situation. 
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Table 3. 
 
Summary of typical cases, where the importance of one 
factor makes one type of decision more appropriate. 
 
1. Remedial effect 
 
The enforcement agency’s aim is to reduce the effect 
of infringements. If the agency perceives differences 
in either appropriateness or time, this may be 
decisive. The agency must also assess its ability to 
obtain legal basis for implementation. 
Article 7 or 9 may both be 
appropriate, depending on the 
specific circumstances. Given that 
the undertakings offer 
commitments, higher probability for 
implementation. 
 
2. Punishment cost. 
 
The consequences of imposing one of the types of 
decisions could be prohibitively high, and actually 
worsen social welfare. E.g. fully fining infringing firm 
in a small oligopoly could in an extreme case lead to 
bankruptcy and worse effects on competition. 
Art. 9 usually more appropriate. 
 
3. Prevention effect 
 
Publicly well-known cases may produce more 
prevention effect than less well-known cases 
(perceived high impact on prevention). While fair and 
equal treatment constrains the agency from 
discriminating specific undertakings, the concern for 
“stating an example” could lead to the agency using 
its legal basis to impose a severe remedy.  
 
Art. 7 usually more appropriate. 
 
4. Clarification of the law 
 
Rigid and thorough procedures tend to be more 
clarifying with regard to the application of law 
generally, than individually tailored remedies. 
Art. 7 decisions far better suited for 
general clarification of competition 
rules, as art. 9 decisions do not 
imply finding infringements.  
 
5. Cost (agency resource use) 
 
If the cost of prosecuting a case is considered high, 
because of complexity, particularly burdensome 
procedural requirements, little expected payoff etc.  
Art. 9 usually more appropriate. 
Art. 10 a. may be appropriate. 
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As can be inferred from the Table 3, the different remedies are more suited to address 
particular concerns than others.  
 
 Article 7 decisions are focused on remedy and prevention. The elaborate formal 
procedures connected with the decisions makes clarifying the law inherent in the 
decision. The procedure does not offer shortcuts with regard to costs, and though 
the agency has a large degree of discretion with regard to remedy, the proceedings 
tend to be more inflexible. 
 
 Art. 9, decisions, on the other hand, are more suited in situations where resource 
use, implementation risk and punishment cost are given more relative weight. They 
do not encompass as elaborate proceedings as those resulting in art. 7 decisions. 
And with regard to legal clarification, they do not imply the finding of 
infringements, and has thus little weight in clarifying the general limits of the law. 
At the same time, there is a less strict limit with regard to the proportionality of the 
decision
215
, and the agency can, at least theoretically, implement wide-reaching 
remedies.  
 
10.3 The implication of the agency’s widened choice of decisions 
The wider specter of sanctions opens up for bigger discretion for the agency, not only with 
regard to decision and remedy, but also with regard to the overall prioritization of the 
weight the different factors should have, because the agency has more options to choose 
from. The modernization reform therefore implies an implicit shift in the power to decide 
competition policy from the legislator to the enforcer. 
 
In light of this increased competence, the agency must understand its role, and mission in a 
broader context than that of a pure enforcer. Because f.ex. art. 9 decisions do not inherently 
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give so much regard to prevention and clarification of the law, the agency must ensure that 
the these factors are given due weight 
 
It is danger that the agency will fail to give due weight to these aims for enforcement. The 
agency could for example be biased in favor of cost and remedy, as they are easiest to 
measure in the specific case. Especially as the agency was allowed to give more weight to 
cost and remedy in its earlier decisions (the procedural framework ensured that other 
considerations were given weight), it is a risk that a continued policy giving most weight to 
these effects will not ensure due regard to externalities because they are not inherently 
ensured in the proceedings. 
 
If the agency does give due weight to the factors contributing to effective enforcement, the 
more flexible rules could, however, give room for more flexible solutions and general 
disposal of cases that yields a higher marginal gain in relation to resources used per case.  
11 Important issues in relation to the introduction of settlements 
11.1 Introduction 
 
An economic analysis is important for the agency in ensuring proper enforcement. As 
demonstrated above, most effects related to competition enforcement, even prevention and 
clarification of law, has economic costs that relate to overall enforcement.  
 
However, an economic analysis cannot exhaustively serve as a guideline for the agency in 
its decision. Complex decisions will always encompass factors that cannot easily be 
quantified. But even though these effects are harder to estimate from an economic 
perspective, they must be taken into account as “constraints” with regard to the agency’s 
maximization in resource use. This is similar to a producer having product quality as a 
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constraint to maximum production (in fact, it is usually implied in most microeconomic 
production maximization problems). 
 
Many important issues arising following  the introduction of settlements have been 
addressed in form of academic criticism. In relation to the economic analysis of this thesis, 
they serve as a natural point of departure for discussing other important issues than the 
economic choice of the agency. Further, by introducing and commenting upon this 
criticism, the economic decision of the Commission is placed in a wider context than the 
limited economic analysis can provide. 
 
In this chapter, I introduce important academic criticism following the introduction  of the 
modernization reform of competition enforcement, and outline the most important issues.  
The purpose of this chapter is to give room to comment on important issues that have been 
raised by academics in relation to the introduction of settlements in the EU. Further, I 
present a comparison between EU and US competition settlements, and comment on the 
differences. The formalized settlement procedures in the EU were inspired by the US use of 
settlements, and an outlook upon the US rules can therefore provide interesting insights. 
 
11.2 Criticism of the introduction of settlements 
The introduction of regulation 1/2003 has given the Commission a far wider specter of 
tools to end competition cases. Quite certainly, it has improved the cost-efficiency of 
competition management, both by abolishing the notification system, and allowed for 
quicker endings in competition cases by using settlements. 
 
In light of the emerging practice of settling cases informally, and the time consuming 
procedures connected with art. 7 decisions, increased use of settlements appear to be a 
natural next step for EU competition law. However, the modernization reform has not been 
entirely unproblematic. 
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The increased use of settlements in EU competition law has raised concern with regard to 
several important issues. These issues relate to the fairness and justice of the procedures. 
Generally, the regard for clarification, prevention and third party interest are externalities, 
and their lack of weight in the agency’s consideration can be regarded as a loophole 
problem
216
, because the agency do not take the entire picture into account.  
11.3 Transparency 
First, the concern for transparency has been raised. Though a part of a formalized 
settlement procedure, other parties than those directly involved may receive far less 
information under art. 9 proceedings than under art. 7 proceedings. In settlement cases, the 
Commission does for example not always send a detailed “statement of objections” to the 
defendant
217
, but, as in the RWE
218
 case, resort to a preliminary assessment finding an 
infringement instead. Transparency was much of the reason why the modernization reform 
was introduced. If the concern for transparency cannot be met, it would undermine much of 
the reasons for formalizing the procedure. Given the extensive powers of the Commission, 
making public more of its case papers could be a way to meet both the concern for 
transparency, and make the decisions subject to more feedback from a wider audience of 
stakeholders. 
 
11.4 Clarification of law 
Many academics have raised concerns in connection with the clarification of law, 
expressing fears that the Commission would use settlements were law is unclear, to avoid 
the strain of a possibly massive trial. If this is the case, the Commission could create an 
own competition policy exempt from court legal control
219
. This is a weighty claim, 
especially as the modernization reform was relatively recently introduced. The need for 
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legal clarification, not only with regard to what constitutes infringements, but also with 
regard how cases are actually ended is vital for the undertakings.  
 
But the EU procedural framework concerning settlements is not necessarily incompatible 
with further clarification of law. In fact, the more formalized framework for negotiated 
remedies makes more information openly available to stakeholders and undertakings which 
the rules concern, if the concern for transparency is met. The Commission must, however, 
take on the extra cost of preparing documents so they may also serve to clarify the law 
beyond what is necessary for the negotiating parties. With regard to transaction costs, this 
could prove not only a procedural safeguard, but also a way of reducing the social cost of 
future competition infringements, by clarifying law for the stakeholders.  
 
An inherent problem with regard to the clarification of law in art. 9 decisions is the lack of 
finding of infringement. This is a problem both generally, as well as for directly affected 
stakeholders. But while future modifications of the procedural system could encompass the 
right to declare infringements also in settlements, it is not evident that this would ensure 
better justice in competition cases. It might merely shift the concern over to the 
Commission using its more extensive powers to threaten undertakings into declaring 
themselves guilty.  
 
The Commission itself says it “will not negotiate the question of existence of an 
infringement”220. With regard to the Commissions competence, this seems to be a sound 
approach given the current procedural rules, provided that the Commission gives 
clarification of law sufficient weight in its choice of type of decision. The extensive use of 
settlements under the new regime may give reason to doubt this. 
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11.5 Procedural safeguards 
Ensuring procedural safeguards has also been voiced as an important concern. The use of 
settlements, especially in the form of commitment decisions imply a form of plea 
bargaining, that may lead to the undertakings being pressed into settlements. As Cooke 
points out, the Commission can give their negotiation terms legal force by decision
221
.  
 
Wils, points out that “the general answer of law appears to be that self-discrimination and 
waivers of procedural rights are unproblematic provided they are voluntary, which requires 
both adequate knowledge and absence of improper compulsion” [Wils’ highlights]222. 
OECD, in their policy brief
223
, holds that these concerns are less weighty in the field of 
competition law, as most undertakings have “sophisticated counsel” with “substantial 
experience”. This reasoning would be in line with the proposed new Alrosa judgment.  
 
It might be held that given the professional scope of competition law, there is much 
injustice that deserves more attention than the possibility for undertakings being pressed 
into unwanted settlements. Given that we want competition law at all, the balance between 
effective and just enforcement will necessarily have to be struck. The burden on the 
decisions place on the firms, should lead to the threshold being set a little higher, but within 
limits, we must accept that the regard for effectiveness and justice in time sometimes 
weights heavier than being absolutely right. 
 
11.6 Third party interests 
Third party interest has also been raised as a concern. In economic terms this is one of 
several “externalities” that may adversely affect social welfare. In addition to other 
externalities like clarification of law and prevention, the agency may risk overlooking this 
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concern when using settlements. In fact this is not only a procedural problem, but also a 
clarification problem for the third party undertaking
224
. The new Alrosa judgment will be 
highly influential also regarding this dimension. 
 
11.7 Backlog problems 
Richard Wish has also raised the question of whether the Commission is misusing the new 
settlement procedures to clear its backlog of difficult cases
225
. This is not necessarily a 
problem. If the Commission, with due regard to clarification of law, and prevention effect 
nonetheless decides to use a more cost-effective procedure, or even drop the case entirely, 
this is only an effect of effectively dealing with cases, which is something that should be 
encouraged rather than frowned upon. But given the vast use us settlements in antitrust 
cases the latter years, Whish’ concern may be indicative of disregard for externalities. 
 
11.8 A comparative outlook: United States antitrust settlements 
The introduction of settlements in EU competition law is to a large extent a development 
deemed necessary in order to adopt a more formal framework for the increasing amount of 
cases where the parties sought to end competition cases outside the scope of art. 17/62
226
. 
But the introduction and the design of the new rules are also heavily inspired by the 
antitrust rules in the United States.  
 
In light of this, in a broad assessment of the use of settlement in EU law, it is useful to look 
closer upon some similarities and differences from the US rules with regard to use of 
settlements.  
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The US procedural endings consist, alike that of EU competition law, of a combination of 
cases adjudicated in the courtroom as well as cases ended by consent decree (settlement). 
However, the administrative system, especially regarding competence and binding 
decisions is somewhat different.  
 
In EU law, the Commission has the authority both to impose legally binding decisions, as 
well as negotiating settlements. In the US system, the competition authorities
227
 can only 
bring cases in for court, not impose decisions like the Commission can
228
. The US decision 
therefore rest, in principle entirely on the court system, while unilateral ending decisions 
can be imposed by the enforcer in EU law. The court’s role in EU law is therefore to 
review the decision, especially with regard to legality, rather than to impose it
229
. This 
affects not only the decisions, but also the negotiation situation; because the Commission 
can threaten to impose its desired “negotiation result” by art. 7 decisions if the undertakings 
do not comply
230
. 
 
This has resulted in US writers tending to criticize EU law for being regulatory
231
, while 
Europeans tend to be willing to give enforcement authorities the upper hand so effective 
settlements can be made. It is not strange that the different legal and governmental attitudes 
should be reflected also in the competence in competition cases. This criticism nonetheless 
points to an important issue, especially because the future effects of competition policy are 
difficult to estimate. 
 
But while the criticism from US writers point to an important issue in EU law, it is not 
given that court decisions would result in better deterrence, particularly as the EU court 
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system is already strained with regard to resources. A difference often overlooked is also 
that the scope of settlements in EU law is somewhat different, and the Commission cannot 
impose fines in settlement cases, opposite of US
232. The Commissions “double role” should 
be less concerning with this in mind.  
 
A further difference between US and EU rules is the difference in use of private 
enforcement, which is far more extensive in the US. Private parties may, alike the US 
competition authorities, bring cases in for court, as well as strike settlements. Currently, the 
Commission is engaged in advocating a wider use of this
233
.  However, the use of private 
enforcement is not entirely unproblematic in an EU setting. First, wider use of private 
enforcement will to a larger degree involve courts in imposing competition decisions. This 
would split the competence which may prove confusing, and result in inconsistent 
enforcement, both in the specific case as well as with regard to the general clarification of 
law. 
 
Private enforcement may also produce different incentives for the undertakings themselves 
with regard to competition enforcement. This may contribute to effective enforcement by 
ensuring that the companies act as “watchdogs” for each other. Given their specific 
industry knowledge, they could provide valuable insights and increase effective detection 
of infringements. On the other hand, it may create incentives for companies to produce 
nuisance suits against competitors. If the Commission should further pursue to create a 
stronger system of private enforcement in the European Union, it must give due regard to a 
fair balance of risk in the proceedings, so the financial incentives to start unreasonable suits 
becomes less tempting. 
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12 An outlook into the future 
12.1 The effect of the recent developments 
The introduction of the modernization reform, and the increased use of settlements in EU 
competition law mark a shift of scope in competition enforcement.  
 
In the proceedings related to the most clear-cut infringements, especially cartels, 
enforcement have been “harder” at least in terms of increasing fines234. The Commission 
also relies much on the firms providing information themselves, in return for reductions in 
fines, under the leniency programme. 
 
In other cases, however, those where settlements are applicable, proceeding based on 
negotiations, results in a shift from the traditional “hard” enforcement, focused on detecting 
and prosecuting competition infringements, to a softer, more dynamic competition 
enforcement. This enforcement is focused on managing the competition rules, and to both 
promote and enforce competition at the same time. 
 
That this results in increased interactions with both undertakings and NCAs from the 
Commission side is hardly surprising. In the last decades, Europe has gone from having 
minimal competition enforcement and no tradition for this, to having a comprehensive 
system for enforcing competition laws. It is first in the last decades that the undertakings 
and NCAs have been mature enough to deal with competition law on an equal standing as 
the Commission. 
 
This increased interaction may provide increased transfer of insights between undertakings 
and enforcer, and probably minimize some problems that have been present during the 
emergence of a comprehensive competition law in Europe. 
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However, there are also inherent dangers to the new regime. It is now more than ever up to 
the players to take different effects into account and more directly influence decisions. The 
biggest potential danger seems to be that the most important players are biased in direction 
of measurable results, and therefore do not give clarification issues due weight. If the 
players fail to give due weight to this, the effect of competition laws will be unclear, and 
the endings of proceedings dependent on negotiation skills rather than the degree of 
infringement. 
 
Besides “hard” prevention, making businesspeople internalize the competition rules in their 
decisions could also efficiently contribute to making competition law more effective. For 
example, softer law, and general competition advocacy could provide a valuable addition to 
more traditional enforcement
235
. Given the shift of scope in some proceedings, to a softer 
enforcement, such a development seems natural. 
 
12.2 The future of competition law 
The role of competition law will continue to be challenged and developed. As of now, 
competition law seems to be a vital component of how governments facilitate markets. It is 
not given however, that governments should interfere too much in markets, and 
competition law is also subject to criticism on more general grounds. 
 
A prominent example is Milton Friedmann
236
 who argues that competition law does more 
harm than good, and he holds that competition law might be theoretically feasible, but 
holds the adverse effects of competition law itself, particularly the cost of enforcing the 
competition rules, to be bigger than the actual gain. 
 
Such an analysis may hold true in the short term. In the long term, however, the results may 
be different. History is full of humans trying to exploit each other, and over time the need 
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for corrections, and deterrence and enforcement of basic rules therefore becomes a 
necessary evil. The current financial crisis clearly demonstrates that businesses may not 
always innately act for society’s good. 
 
In this respect, it can be useful to remember that competition law has been an aspect of 
almost any bigger civilization, earliest recorded in the Roman republic to protect its trade 
of grain against manipulating supply
237
. Seemingly, there is a need for government 
intervention towards some actions carried out by businesses, although the limits and type of 
intervention are debatable. 
 
Rather than hoping to abolish competition law entirely, we should therefore hope that 
competition law will develop, and produce better results at a lessened cost for society. In 
this respect, the development of more flexible enforcement is hopefully a natural step 
towards an evolution of a more mature competition law, even better serving European 
markets.  
13 Conclusion 
The purpose of this analysis has been to outline, and discuss the introduction of more 
formalized settlements in EU competition law. My analysis shows that the new rules  may 
lead to more efficient use of resources, but also that the agency is given a broader 
enforcement responsibility: 
 
1. The introduction of settlements represents a shift in the enforcement competence of 
the Commission 
a. The Commission has traditionally had a great deal of discretion with regard 
to the outcome of competition proceedings, but the proceedings themselves 
                                                 
237
 The law of restrictive trade practices and monopolies (1966) p. 20. 
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have been subject to relatively rigid procedural regulations. With the 
introduction of the modernization reform, the Commission has gained a 
wider specter of types of decisions, and different tracks of proceedings 
leading to them. 
 
b. Combined with the extensive discretionary competence regarding the 
outcome of the proceedings, the widened specter of proceedings implies an 
increased power of the Commission to decide policy. 
 
c. This development represents an inclination for the enforcement agency to 
turn its role into being a  manager of the competition rules rather than 
merely guarding the rules as an enforcer 
 
2. An economic analysis can serve as an important guideline to the Commission’s 
decision. 
a. An economic analysis structure the deliberations and analyzes the enforcer 
must carry out before making the decision. 
 
b. This thesis points out the main factors that must be included in the analysis 
and how the different considerations can and should be balanced against 
each other. 
 
c. Since the agency has limited resources, the distribution of the agency’s 
resources will affect the effect of enforcement. Maximizing the effect of 
enforcement could and should be done through distributing resources where 
they can provide the greatest gain in enforcement. 
 
d.  The thesis may not necessarily give guidance on how much weight should 
be given to the different considerations, and some of the considerations 
(costs, benefits) are more easily quantified than others. 
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3. Overall consideration for all elements of deterrence is paramount, including 
consideration for prevention and legal clarification when selecting which cases to 
prosecute and, if so, what type of decision to use. 
 
a. Using a variety of tools for different infringements may increase gain, 
because it allows the agency a wider choice to choose the most effective 
type of decision. 
 
b. However, the widened choice of type of decision corresponds to a greater 
risk for adverse effects if the Commission fails to give due weight to all 
factors contributing to the marginal gain of prosecuting a case, e.g. 
clarification and prevention, or gives too large weight to other, typically cost 
and remedy. 
 
c. The extent of the use of settlements in EU law may give reason for concerns 
that less easily measurable externalities (i.e. clarification and prevention) are 
being given less weight in competition proceedings. 
 
14 APPENDIX: Present use of settlements in EU competition enforcement 
14.1 Introduction 
In this appendix, I will investigate the present use of settlement in EU competition 
enforcement. Statistics will be used to quantify the impact of the use of settlements. The 
purpose of this appendix is to give an illustration of the importance of settlements in 
current EU competition enforcement, and describe the scope of use of settlements. 
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14.2 The introduction of the modernization regulation 
Regulation 1/2003 was mainly aimed at creating a more efficient framework to facilitate 
better use of the Commissions resources. Primarily, the abolition of the notification scheme 
was intended to free up resources, allowing the Commission to focus more extensively on 
antitrust and cartel cases
238
. 
 
Indeed, the Commission initially thought Commitment decisions to be rather rare and 
unusual instruments for ending antitrust cases
239
. However, the new institute of 
commitment decisions has proved to be a very much used legal basis for Commission 
decision in the years following the introduction of the new regulation. 
 
The new flexibility with regard to sanctions appears to have been appreciated by both the 
undertakings and the Commission, both of whom have taken initiatives to settle cases
240
.  
14.3 Statistics241 
Statistics may even better than qualitative assessments give an illustration to the extent and 
scope of the use of settlements in EU competition law. The tables below are updated as of 
April 2009. Since there is always cases pending, and given the timeframe of some 
competition cases, the numbers should be taken as indicative rather than representative the 
use of settlement. Still, they show a shift in use of legal decisions for ending cases from the 
Commission 
 
Table 4: Overall use of settlements 
 
  Art. 7 Art. 9 
Use of 
settlements 
                                                 
238
 Regulation 1/2003 recital 2. 
239
 Temple Lang, annual proceedings of the Fordham Corporate law institute, p 270.  
240
 Scweizer (2008) p. 5. 
241
 The statistics in this chapter is complied by the author on basis of the case list in the annex of “Final 
commission staff working paper accompanying the communication from the commission to the European 
parliament and council report on the functioning of regulation 1/2003”. 
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2004 8   0,00 % 
2005 7 2 22,22 % 
2006 8 4 33,33 % 
2007 11 5 31,25 % 
2008 8 1 11,11 % 
2009 2 1 33,33 % 
Total 44 13 22,81 % 
 
 
Table 4 shows the total number and percentage distribution of art. 7 and art. 9 decisions 
respectively following the introduction of reg. 1/2003. In 2004 there were no commitment 
decisions, most likely because the new regime required some time to be established after 
the introduction of the rules. The last years are likewise not as representative because of 
pending cases. Highlighting the most “normal” years, 2005-2007, settlements does in these 
years amount to almost a third of the total number of competition decisions adopted by the 
Commission in this period. 
 
The results becomes even more interesting if one looks upon use of settlements only in 
antitrust (AT) cases. As indicated already in the recital of regulation 1/2003
242
, settlements 
are not deemed appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine. As 
fines are generally more used in cartel cases, it is therefore first and foremost in antitrust 
cases the choice between different types of decisions is essential:  
 
 
Table 5: Use of settlement in antitrust cases 
AT Art. 7 Art. 9 
Use of 
settlements 
2004 3 0 0,00 % 
2005 2 2 50,00 % 
2006 1 4 80,00 % 
2007 4 5 55,56 % 
                                                 
242
 Recital 13, Reg. 1/2003. 
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2008 1 1 50,00 % 
2009 0 1 100,00 % 
Total 11 13 54,17 % 
 
As demonstrated by table 5, settlements have been widely used to end antitrust cases, in 
over 50 % of the cases. This is by far a larger percentage of the antitrust cases than one 
would have foreseen at the introduction of regulation 1/2003. It seems too early to indicate 
whether the level of use of commitment decision the first years will be representative for 
the commission’s means of ending cases also in the future, but the vast initial use suggests 
that a substantial part of antitrust cases will be ended using commitment decision also in 
the future. 
 
The use of commitment decision has been to a wide range of cases, regarding different 
infringements of EU law. 
 
Table 6: Scope of action: Use of art. 9 remedies in relation to different forms of 
competition infringements. 
ART. 9 Remedies A101 A102 
  
  
  
2005       
Bundesliga 
 
1   
Coca-Cola 
  
1 
2006       
De Beers 
 
1 1 
FAPL 
 
1   
Repsol  
 
1   
Cannes Agreement 1   
2007       
DaimlerChrysler 1   
Fiat 
 
1   
Opel 
 
1   
Toyota Motor Europe 1   
Distrigaz 
  
1 
2008       
E.ON German electricity 1 1 
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market 
2009       
RWE Gas Foreclosure 
 
1 
  
  
  
Total   10 4 
%*   77 % 31 % 
 
Table 6 exhibits the wide range of different cases in which the Commission has used 
commitment decisions to end various kinds of infringements, both relating to art. 101 and 
art. 102 infringements.  
 
With regard to type of remedy, commitment decisions have also been used to impose 
structural remedies on the undertakings, as in both RWE and E.ON, otherwise most 
remedies have been behavioral. 
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